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The Securities and Exchange Commission's
Administrative, Enforcement, and Legislative
Programs and Policies - Their Influence on
Corporate Internal Affairs
Marc I Steinberg*
Less than two years ago, some authorities criticized the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") for overstepping its statutory authority. These critics argued that the SEC's
myriad activities advanced a carefully wrought and exquisitely detailed master plan to raise the level of corporate accountability. According to these critics, the Commission's administrative,
enforcement, and legislative programs and policies were aimed at
regulating corporate internal affairs.'
This assertion was an overstatement. Life is much more prosaic
at the Commission. SEC regulation during the Chairmanship of
Harold M. Williams, 2 although undoubtedly affecting corporate
processes, was principally directed to addressing particular conditions, wrongdoings, and deficiencies. Nonetheless, there is much
truth to the statement that the Commission desired to raise the level
of corporate consciousness. Indeed, while former Chairman Williams' speeches reflected generalized views on corporate governance
and accountability, 3 the Commission's disclosure, enforcement, and
legislative policies represented significant regulatory actions to in*
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1 See generally Kripke, The SEC, CorporateGovernance, and the RealIssues, 36 Bus. LAw. 173
(1981); Wolfson, A Critiqueof the Securities andExchange Commission, 30 EMORY L.J. 119 (1981).
2 Harold M. Williams served as Chairman of the SEC from 1977 to 1981.
3 See notes 30-41 infa and accompanying text.
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duce corporations to be more accountable to their shareholders and
the public.
In the last two years, some SEC policies have unquestionably
changed. As evidenced in both rhetoric and action, there has been a
shift in Commission philosophy. For example, Commission policies
now appear to be more concerned with aiding the capital formation
process. 4 The theme of corporate accountability has all but vanished
under the present chairmanship of John S.R. Shad. Nonetheless, the
nature of the Commission's activities necessarily affects internal corporate processes. By pursuing its various and sometimes changing
policies, the Commission exerts a very significant influence on corporate internal affairs.
This Article will examine the methods by which the Commission
affects internal corporate processes. Following a discussion of the
general methods of administration and enforcement, the Article will
examine the Commission's exhortatory approach. Next, the Article
will discuss the SEC's disclosure processes, focusing on their impact
on corporate internal affairs. Later sections examine SEC substantive "non-enforcement" regulation, law enforcement and related proceedings, the Commission's legislative program, and the
Commission's amicus curiae program. Finally, the Article describes
how the various Commission initiatives addressed to lawyers and accountants may affect their clients' internal affairs.
I.

General Methods of Administration and Enforcement

In undertaking its administrative and enforcement responsibilities, the Commission has generally employed adjudication, rulemaking, and occasionally, legislation. For example, in In re Cady, Roberts
& Co. ,5 the Commission in an administrative proceeding extended
liability under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19346
4 See notes 154-78 infra and accompanying text.
5 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
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and rule 10b-5 prescribed thereunder 7 by holding that a brokerdealer who received material nonpublic information from a corporate director had an affirmative duty to disclose that information to
purchasers to whom he sold the corporation's stock.8 Cady, Roberts
represented, as the Supreme Court recently perceived, "an important
step in the development of § 10(b)." 9
Subsequent Commission actions and judicial decisions have reId.
7

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.

Id.
8 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). The Commission based its extension of liability on the
Securities Exchange Act's broad remedial purpose of reaching deceptive and manipulative
practices, whether or not the practices would have been actionable at common law. Id. at
913-14. See notes 9-13 infra.
9 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980). The Chiarella Court held that
silence will not give rise to § 10(b) liability without a duty to disclose. However, the Court
appears to have reinforced the principle that a duty to disclose or abstain from trading does
arise when insiders and their tippees possess material nonpublic information. The Court
reasoned:
The SEC took an important step in the development of § 10(b) when it held
that a broker-dealer and his firm violated that section by selling securities on the
basis of undisclosed information obtained from a director of the issuer corporation
who was also a registered representative of the brokerage firm. In Cad, Roberts
Co., the Commission decided that a corporate insider must abstain from trading in
the shares of his corporation unless he has first disclosed all material inside information known to him. The obligation to disclose or abstain derives from
"[ain affirmative duty to disclose mateial information [which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held that insiders must
disclose materialfacts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which
are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect
their investment judgment."
Id. at 226-27 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. at 911). See also 445 U.S. at 230 n.12. In Marrerro v. Banco di Roma (Chicago), 487
F. Supp. 568 (E.D. La. 1980), the district court stated that, in view of Chiarella,
[f]actors to be considered in ascertaining whether such a relationship [of trust and
confidence] exists include the parties' relative access to the information, the benefit
to be derived by the defendant from the sale, defendant's awareness of plaintiff's
reliance on him in reaching his investment decision, and defendant's role in initiating the purchase or sale.
Id. at 574. See also note 10 infa.
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fined and textured the obligation to disclose or refrain from trading
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 10 Indeed, it was partially due to
one such subsequent decision that the Commission responded
through the rulemaking process. In Chiarella v. United States,' the
Supreme Court held that a financial printer, who purchased stock
after deciphering from confidential documents entrusted to his employer that certain companies were to be the subjects of mergers or
tender offers, did not breach a duty to the investing public under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.12 In the aftermath of Chiarella, the SEC
10 See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (employee of financial printer
not liable); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (bank held liable); In
re Dirks, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir.) (securities analyst liable), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3378
(U.S. Nov. 16, 1982); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (employees of an
investment banking firm and their tippees held liable on misappropriation rationale); Elkind
v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980) (corporate officer, tipper liability); SEC
v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1979) (investment manager not liable); Zweig v.
Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979) (financial columnist liable); SEC v. Geon Indus.,
Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976) (corporate officer held liable for tip at bar of country club);
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) (institutional investor liable); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970) (stockbroker who was making market in securities held liable); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969) (corporation that manipulated market during takeover bid held liable), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (insider and tippee liability), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); SEC v.
Roussel, 485 F. Supp. 295 (D. Kan. 1980) (securities broker-dealer liable); United States v.
Hall, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,675 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (attorney
liable); In re Fleiss, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,471 (S.E.C.
1980) (salesman employed by broker-dealer; court entered consent order); SEC v. Lerner,
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,334 (D.D.C. 1980) (law firm;
court entered consent order); In re Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080 (1969) (underwriters liable). See also Insider Trading by Law Firm Employees, SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No.
13,437, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,116 (S.E.C. 1977) (the
obligation not to trade on confidential nonpublic information "extends not only to partners
in the law firm but also to associated lawyers and service personnel employed by the firm.").
See generally Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule lOb-5 and Insider Troding, 30 EMORY L.J. 263 (1981); Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L.
REV. 1 (1980); Hazen, Symposium Introduction-TheSupreme Court and the SecuritiesLaws: Has the
Pendulum Slowed., 30 EMORY LJ. 5, 22-24 (1981); Herlihy & Weir, Insiders, Outsiders.- The
Commission'sEfforts to Outlaw Insider Trading, in PROXY CONTESTS AND BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 421 (P.L.I. 1981); Langevoort, Insider TradingandtheFiduciar Principle."A PostChiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1982); Morrison, Silence is Golden: Trading on Nonpublic Market Information, 8 SEC. REG. LJ. 211 (1980); Steinberg, Fiduciay Duties and Disclosure
Obligations in Proxy and Tender Contest for Corporate Control, 30 EMORY L.J. 169, 171-73 (1981);
Wang, Trading on MaterialNonpublic Information on ImpersonalStock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and
Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lOb-S?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217 (1981).
11 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
12 Id. Thus, the Court held that silence, absent a duty to disclose, will not give rise to
§ 10(b) liability. The Court stated:
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable
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promulgated rule 14e-3., which establishes a "disclose or abstain from
trading" rule under section 14(e) of the Williams Act. 13
The Commission occasionally has employed both adjudication
4
and rulemaking in a single proceeding. For example, in Inre Carter,'
the Commission in a rule 2(e) proceeding 5 set forth a standard for
under § 10(b) despite the absence of statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But such liability ispremised upon a duty
to disclose arisingfrom a relationshipof trust
and confdence between parties to a transaction.
Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders,
who have an obligation to place the shareholder's welfare before their own, will not
benefit personally through fraudulent use of material,nonpublic information.
Id. at 230 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
13 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1982); SEC Sec. Act Release No. 6,239, Exch. Act Release
No. 17,120, Inv. Co. Act No. 11,336, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
82,646. As adopted, with certain exceptions, rule 14e-3 applies this disclose-or-abstain provision to the possession of material information relating to a tender offer where the person
knows or has reason to know that the information is non-public and was received directly or
indirectly from the offeror, the subject corporation, any of their affiliated persons, or any
person acting on behalf of either company. Moreover, the rule contains a broad anti-tipping
provision and provides exceptions for sales to the offeror and for certain activities by multiservice financial institutions.
As stated by this commentator:
In regard to SEC authority to adopt rule 14e-3 [17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981)],
the following rationales may be used as support: (1) Section 14(e) of the Exchange
Act grants the SEC authority "by rules and regulations. . . [to] prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). (2) Congressional testimony in
1968 Williams Act hearings highlighted the market disruptions and abusive practices associated with leaks by the bidder relating to a tender offer. (3) During the
hearings on the amendment to the Williams Act in 1970, the issue of trading on
material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer was brought to Congress'
attention in the discussion of the manner in which the SEC would implement its
rulemaking authority under § 14(e) of the Exchange Act. (4) As observed by the
Supreme Court, the Williams Act was designed to avert a stampede effect. Rondeau
v.Mosinee PaperCorp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 n.8 (1975). Trading on material information
and tipping such information tends, in the tender offer context, to promote this
effect. (5) As an additional basis, other than the broad rulemaking language of
§ 14(e) and the pertinent legislative history, the SEC has general rulemaking authority under § 23(a) of the Exchange Act to adopt rules and regulations that are
reasonably related to its specific statutory functions. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1976).
Steinberg, supra note 10, at 174-75 n.7 (citation omitted). One court has recently upheld the
validity of rule 14e-3. O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,443, at 92,629-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). But see
Gruenbaum, The New Disclose or Abstainfrom TradingRule: Has the SEC Gone Too Far?,4 CORP.
L. REv. 350 (1981); Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule le-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus Economic
Theogy, 37 Bus. LAW. 517, 557 (1982). See generaly Note, Trading on Material,Nonpublic Information Under Rule 1le-3, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 539 (1981).
14 [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 (S.E.C. 1981).
15 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1982). For a description of rule 2(e), see note 253 injfa.
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ethical conduct that had prospective application. 16 In that decision,
the Commission also stated that it intended to solicit public comment
17
regarding the standard adopted.
By exercising its discretion to choose between adjudication and
rulemaking, the Commission has been able to efficiently pursue its
statutory mandates.' 8 This practice has generally received judicial
approbation.' 9 As the Supreme Court stated in SEC v. Cheneg
Corp. ,20 "[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or
by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency."' 2 1 The fact that the
adjudication will have far-reaching impact is not normally dispositive of whether the agency abused its discretion in selecting adjudication over rulemaking. 22 This principle, however, may have been
eroded somewhat by the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Ford v.
16

[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH)

82,847, at 84,172-73. For more

discussion on this standard, see notes 253-66 infra and accompanying text.
17 [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,170. The Commission
subsequently did solicit comment. SEC Sec. Act Release No. 6,344, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,026 (Sept. 21, 1981). For more discussion, see notes
249-66 infra and accompanying text.
18 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Federal Administrative Agencies in Support of Petition for
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008
(9th Cir. 1982).
19 See notes 20-22 infra.
20 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
21 Id. at 203 (emphasis in original). See also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,
294 (1974) (the NLRB "is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative
proceeding and. . . the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance
within the Board's discretion."); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765 (1969)
("Adjudicated cases may and do, of course, serve as vehicles for the formulation of agency
policies, which are applied and announced therein.").
22 As stated by one source:
When an agency is deciding between rulemaking and adjudication, the three
Supreme Court cases [Cheneyy, Wyman-Cordon, and Bell Aerospace] indicate that the
agency decision will not be overruled unless there has been an abuse of discretion.
In such cases, however, the burden of proof lies with the party challenging the
agency choice of proceeding. This burden of proof is most often satisfied where a
party demonstrates that due to the agency action he has suffered seriousadverse consequences. In rendering its decision the court must balance the interests of the affected
party against those of the agency, and although the court may indicate its preference for rulemaking, the court may order rulemaking only on a definite showing of
abuse of discretion.
3 MEZINES, STEIN & GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 14.01 (1981) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See British Caledonian Airways, Ltd. v. CAB, 584 F.2d 982, 994 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Drug Package, Inc. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1340, 1346 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978); Giles Lowery
Stockyards, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 565 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 957 (1978); NLRB v. A.P.W. Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir. 1963); 2 DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.25 (2d ed. 1979). See also note 21 supra.
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FTC.23 The court in Ford, in holding that the Federal Trade Commission exceeded its authority by creating new law through adjudication rather than rulemaking, premised its decision on the
consequence that the FTC's order would have widespread
24
application.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the SEC generally has relatively broad discretion to select the forum which it believes will
most effectively enable it to carry out its legitimate functions and
policies in a particular proceeding. The result is that the Commission's diverse programs and their concomitant impact on corporate
internal affairs are usually effectuated by either adjudication or
rulemaking. The Commission also may seek or promote legislation
25
to resolve widespread and egregious misconduct.
II.

Exhortation

The exhortatory approach, perhaps more appropriately viewed
as jawboning, was frequently employed during the Williams Chairmanship to help remedy certain perceived problems in the corporate
machinery. 26 Undoubtedly, this approach was directed at corporate
management and self-regulatory organizations. Regardless of the
particular problem addressed, the SEC's exhortatory approach generally seeks to ameliorate or address particular weaknesses in the cor23 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1982).
24 Id. at 1009-10. See Patel v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 638 F.2d 1199 (9th
Cir. 1980). But see Brief, supra note 18, where nine federal administrative agencies jointly filed
an amicus curiae brief in support of the FTC's petition for rehearing and suggestion for
rehearing en banc. Referring to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the agencies argued that "[t]o
state, as the present opinion does, that articulation of 'new law' in an adjudication with potentially widespread applicability constitutes an abuse of discretion is to effect a major alteration in the way in which administrative agencies operate, and to cast substantial doubt upon
the validity of ongoing and future adjudication." Id. at 4. The petition was denied. See 673
F.2d at 1010-12.
25 One example of such legislation is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95213, tit. I, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to dd-2 (1976 & Supp. I
1977). For discussion on the Act, see notes 224-31 infra and accompanying text.
Even before the Act's passage, the SEC effectively dealt with illegal corporate payment
practices through enforcement actions and its Questionable Payments Program. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978); SENATE COMMITTEE
ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND ExCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAY-

MENTS PRAcTIcES 20 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as SEC QUESTIONABLE
PAYMENTS REPORT].

26 The SEC has also affected corporate conduct by issuing reports and holding conferences, several of which have been conducted with the assistance of leading members of the
securities bar. See notes 48-76 in/fa and accompanying text.
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porate accountability mechanism without imposing government
regulation.
A. Jawboning
In a variety of contexts, SEC Commissioners have addressed corporate mechanisms and procedures that, -in their views, needed increased accountability. For example, former Commissioner Phillip
A. Loomis, Jr., urged that corporations should adopt their own codes
of conduct to provide officers and employees with sufficient guidance
for determining acceptable behavior in business dealings. 2 7 Accord-

ing to Commissioner John Evans, disclosure should extend beyond
financial matters to social issues, thereby enhancing accountability to
shareholders and the public.

28

On the other hand, former Commis-

sioner Roberta Karmel, an outspoken critic of SEC policy during the
Williams era, cautioned that SEC policies to promote corporate accountability should "go forward in an atmosphere of respectful, crea'29
tive tension.
The most active Commissioner in addressing perceived
problems of corporate accountability was former Chairman Williams. Chairman Williams preferred a corporate structure that held
those who wield corporate powers accountable for the consequences
of their stewardship. To help effectuate this objective, Chairman
Williams' ideal board of directors would consist entirely of independent directors except for the Chief Executive Officer, who would not
serve as Chairman of the Board. In defining directors who would be
independent of management, Chairman Williams excluded the cor30
poration's outside counsel, investment bankers and major suppliers.
27 Loomis, Speech before the National Association of Corporate Directors and the Institute of Auditors, reportedin [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 581, at D-I (Dec. 3,
1980).
28 See FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 886, Part I, at 4 (Nov. 19, 1980). But see SENATE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 277

(Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as SEC STAFF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT] ("Proposals that the Commission move away from primarily an economic test of materiality [to require disclosure of socially significant information] are troubling to the staff
because there is no readily available alternative basis for determining the materiality of
information.").
29 Karmel, "The Quest for Accountability," Address before the Middle Atlantic Regional Group of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries 12 (Jan. 9, 1980).
30 See Williams, "Corporate Accountability," Address before the Fifth Annual Securities
Regulation Institute, San Diego, Cal., at 26 (Jan. 18, 1978); Williams, "Corporate Accountability and Corporate Power," presented at the Fairless Lecture Series, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Oct. 24, 1979). In this regard, the American Bar Association's
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Moreover, he stressed that audit, nominating, and compensation
committees should play an integral part in the accountability
3t
process.
Chairman Williams also addressed the roles of the lawyer and
the accountant in the accountability process. He stated that corporate counsel has the opportunity to bring considerations of both ethics and law to bear on a corporation's behavior. 32 Noting that the
responsibility and prestige of inside counsel have increased dramatically in recent years, Chairman Williams stressed that such persons
should play an active role in shaping corporate events as they occur,
in assessing and determining corporate policies, and in establishing
the tone and standard for what may be called "the conduct of corporations.1 33 In discussing the accountant's role, Chairman Williams,
Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law recommended that corporate boards be
comprised of a majority of non-management directors and that each important committee,
except for the executive committee, have only nonmanagement members. CORPORATE DiRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK (rev. ed. 1978), reprintedin 33 Bus. LAw. 1591 (1978). But see Kripke,
supra note 1, at 175-79.
31 See Williams, Speech before the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, reportedin FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 885, Part I, at 6 (Nov. 12, 1980). See also Brudney, The Independent
Director-Heaveny City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982). At Chairman Williams request, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) required as a listing requirement that
domestic firms maintain audit committees comprised solely of outside directors. Some commentators contend that the Commission compelled the NYSE to adopt this measure. See
Coffee, Bovond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Towarda Theoretical View of CorporateMisconduct andan Efective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1274 (1977) ("I']he SEC virtually thrust the audit
committee rule upon the New York Stock Exchange. . . 2"); Kripke, supra note 1, at 190 ("to
characterize the New York Stock Exchange's action as that of a self-regulatory agency providing voluntary leadership. . . is unreal"). More recently, the American Stock Exchange and
the Board of Governors of the National Association of Securities Dealers have taken action in
regard to the establishment of audit committees. See SEC STAFF CORPORATE AcCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 28, at 637-39.
It is possible that this "exhortatory" approach, along with other factors, has partially
achieved its objective. For example, in the fall of 1978, the NYSE conducted a corporate
governance survey. Questionnaires were mailed by the American Association of Corporate
Secretaries to their 1,700 members, of which 993 responded (58%). 655 NYSE companies.
responded. The survey indicated that approximately 80% of the companies responding had a
board of directors composed of a majority of nonmanagerial directors; the number of companies that had established audit, compensation, and nominating committees had significantly
increased since 1975; the committees composed of nonmanagerial directors had increased significantly since 1975; and 92% of the companies responding (both NYSE and non-NYSE
companies) maintained an audit committee composed ofnonmanagerial directors. Both 1980
and 1981 studies indicate that, from a corporate accountability perspective, these figures have
improved. See notes 58, 70 & 274-75 infra and accompanying text.
32 Williams, CorporateAccountability and the Lawyer'r Role, 34 Bus. LAw. 7, 13 (1978).
33 Williams, The Role of Inside Counsel in Corporate Accountability, [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,318, at 82,369 (Oct. 4, 1979). For further discussion on
this issue, see Ferrara & Steinberg, The Role ofInside Counsel in the CorporateAccountability Process,
4 CORP. L. REv. 3 (1981).
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among other suggestions, encouraged the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to adopt a professional standard mandat3
ing independent audit committees.

4

It bears emphasis that while Chairman Williams and other
Commissioners exhorted those involved in the corporate machinery
to remedy certain perceived deficiencies, they, for the most part,
called for voluntary initiatives rather than governmental intervention. Although some commentators have suggested that such statements of voluntary action represented an in terrorem approach,3 5 the
fact of the matter is that the Commission has frequently opposed undue federal incursion into the corporate accountability area. Chairman Williams stated that he "ha[d] little confidence in Government's
ability to dictate corporate governance structure without becoming
oppressively destructive. '3 6 Thus, for example, in testimony before
the Senate Subcommittee on Securities regarding the proposed Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, which attempted to establish federal minimum standards relating to the composition of
corporate boards, rights of shareholders, and duties of corporate directors and board committees,3 7 Chairman Williams expressed his
opposition to such government intervention.38 While sensing the
34 Williams, "The Role of the Director in Corporate Accountability," Address before the
Economic Club of Detroit 24 (May 1, 1978).
35 See Kripke, supra note 1, at 191 ("The constant repetition of the refrain-that experts
and institutions of the financial world, iLe., the accounting standard setters, the auditors, the
lawyers, must voluntarily improve the arrangements for internal control and corporate governance or government will step in-is too insistent to be passed off as mere exhortation to
voluntary action.").
36

FINANCIER (CORRESPONDENCE), Aug. 1980, at 15-16.

37 S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See Corporation Democracy Act of 1980, H.R.
7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). Pertinent provisions of the bills would have required that a
majority of a corporation's board be composed of independent directors, that the audit and
nominating committees be composed solely of independent directors, that each director has a
"duty of loyalty" and a "duty of care" to the corporation and its shareholders, that cumulative voting be required, that shareholders be entitled to vote on major corporate transactions,
and that extensive disclosure be required in regard to such matters as employment discrimination, compliance with environmental controls, tax rates, cost of legal and accounting fees,
and planned plant closings. See generally Metzenbaum, Legislative Approaches to CorporateGovernance, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 926 (1981) ("There is widespread agreement within and without
the business community that reforms are necessary in the governance of the nation's major
corporations."); Millspaugh, The Corporate Democracy Act-A Renaissance or Death Knel for the
Corporate World?, 4 CORP. L. REv. 291 (1981).
38 Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980. Hearings on . 2561 Before the Subcornar on
Securities ofthe Senate Comm on Banking, Housing, and Urban Afairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-67
(1980) (statement of SEC Chairman Williams). In his testimony, Chairman Williams stated
that "the views which I express today are my own and not necessarily those of my fellow
Commissioners-although I believe that at least a majority would agree with my conclusion
at this time." Id. at 39.
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need for enhancing corporate accountability by increasing the role
and responsibility of independent directors, he expressed "severe reservations about the wisdom of legislation designed to regulate the
corporate boardroom," and concluded that enactment of the bill
might well "retard" the goals that it intended to achieve. 39 Other
examples of deference to voluntary action include the Commission's
long-held view of looking to the private sector to promulgate accounting standards, notwithstanding its statutory authority in this
area, and urging Congress that the accounting profession be given
the opportunity for self-reform. 4° By contrast, the Commission
strongly advocated legislation to deal with improper payments and
off-books slush funds when it perceived that only legislation would
41
correct the widespread abuses that then existed.
Rhetoric urging improved standards of corporate accountability
and governance has largely disappeared during the Shad Chairmanship. Indeed, jawboning currently focuses on the capital formation
process, and stresses that the abuse of inside information is a matter
of major enforcement priority.42 In this regard, Chairman Shad has
called upon investment banking, brokerage, and law firms, as well as
publicly-held corporations, to help ferret out such abuses. 43
An argument can be made that the Commission's apparent
abandonment of the corporate accountability rhetoric is well
founded. During a recessionary period, capital formation, rather
than the number of independent directors on corporate boards, will
help stimulate the economy. Moreover, insider trading constitutes
one of the greatest threats to maintaining the integrity of the market39 Id. at 60.
40 See Securities and Exchange Commission Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and the
Commission's Oversight Role, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,120, at
81,594 (June 28, 1979). In the concluding remarks to its second report to Congress, the Commission stated that it was not recommending legislation to supersede or control the regulation
of accountants. Id. at 81,973. For more discussion on this point, see Gruenbaum & Steinberg,
Accountants' Ziabilit and Responribility: Securities, Criminal and Common Law, 13 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 247, 292-94 (1980).
41 See Foreign CorruptPrasticesand Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure: Hearingson S
305 before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Afairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 111
(1977) (statement of SEC Chairman Hill); Unlawful CorporatePayments Act of 1977: Hearingson
H.R. 3815 and H.)Z 1602 Before the Subcomm. on ConsumerProlectionand Financeofthe House Comm.
on InterstateandForeignCommerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 196 (1977) (statement of SEC Chairman

Williams).
42 See, e.g., Hudson, SEC May Be Losing Its Former Toughness, Some Obsevers Think, Wall St.
J., Mar. 22, 1982, at 1, col. 1; The SECSwats at Insider Trading, Business Week, Apr. 19, 1982,

at 96.
43 See Hudson, supra note 42, at 18; [July-Dec.] SEc. REc. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 612, at
A-4 (July 15, 1981).
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place and investor protection. 44 Nonetheless, it may be argued that
the Commission's focus is too narrow. The Commission's current
rhetoric may imply that the SEC is concerned only with so-called
traditional frauds, thereby greatly diminishing the advances made in
the Stanley Sporkin era4 5 to seek enforcement solutions for a wide
range of corporate activities that implicate the federal securities
laws.4 6 Hence, it may be argued that while capital formation is laudable, the SEC is not a chamber of commerce. In short, the Commission was created primarily to protect the investing public, not to
47
serve the interests of business.
B.

Reports and Conferences

During the past decade, the Commission and its staff, with substantial input from the private sector, have sponsored or participated
in at least three major reports or conferences: the SEC Major Issues
Conference, 48 the Advisory Committee Report on Corporate Disclosure, 49 and the SEC Staff Corporate Accountability Report. 50 Each
of these undertakings concerned, at least in part, the impact of SEC
regulation and exhortation upon certain developments in corporate
internal affairs. For example, the Final Report of the SEC Major
Issues Conference discussed the desirability that reporting companies
51
maintain audit committees composed of independent directors.
Along similar lines, the Advisory Committee Report on Corporate
44 See general.' notes 9-13 supra.
45 Stanley Sporkin was Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement from 1974 to 1981.
46 As stated in a recent article: "Under Mr. Sporkin, the SEC brought about 60 cases
alleging corporate bribery overseas, uncovered several instances of secret self-dealing by top
corporate officers and tackled some of the most prestigious accounting firms, underwriters
and law firms." Hudson, supra note 42, at 18.
47 See id.; Vilkin, SEC.: An Agency in Turmoil?, National Law Journal, Mar. 29, 1982, at I,
col. 1.
48 SECMajorIssues Conference.- DraftReport, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
80,979 (1977). Sixty-four participants, including former SEC commissioners, industrialists,
academicians, members of public interest organizations, and members of the law and accounting professions, attended this SEC-sponsored conference. The conference dealt with
major policy issues that important SEC decisions would consider.
49 HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESs., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC (Comm. Print

1977). The advisory committee was established to study the mandated disclosure system. But
see Kripke, Where Are We On SecuritiesDisclosureAfter the Advisog Committee Report?, 6 SEC. REG.
L.J. 99 (1978).
50 SEC STAFF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 28.
51 SEC Major Issues Conference, supra note 48, at 8. The conferees also "urged that the
establishment of such committees should be expanded beyond companies listed on the New
York Stock Exchange. . . ." Id.
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Disclosure recommended that the Commission should promulgate requirements that enhance "the ability of directors-as the representative shareholders-to serve as the independent, effective monitors of
'52
management.
The most intensive study of corporate internal affairs was undoubtedly the 1980 Staff Report on Corporate Accountability. This
study, the result of a three year effort, drew upon public hearings and
comments received from several different groups, including corporations, self-regulatory organizations, law firms, financial institutions,
public interest groups, academicians, and government officials. 53 Its
genesis lay not in a generalized academic concept of ideal corporate
structure, but in the wake of "the collapse of several major companies, the hundreds of corporations involved in questionable payments, and corporate non-compliance with environmental and other
laws [which] astonished the public, shareholders, and, in many cases,

even the affected companies' directors."' 54 The Report noted that
successive investigations and reports suggested that the corporate accountability framework needed to be strengthened. 55 The Report
carefully and narrowly focused on the corporation's accountability to
shareholders and investors, leaving "others" to consider the "larger
corporate accountability issues [which] transcend the jurisdiction
and expertise of this Commission"-the obligations of corporations
to noninvestor constituencies such as "employees, consumers, communities, federal, state and local governments and the public
generally.

'5 6

Although the Report makes several specific recommendations, it
does not propose major substantive or procedural innovations. The
Report generally sets out staff discussion on a broad range of signifi52 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 49, at D-22. Other Advisory Committee recommendations included a requirement that shareholders be given information regarding "the identification of the nominating committee members and a requirement that if a
director resigns and submits a letter stating a reason, that letter should be filed with a Form 8K if the director so requests." Id. at 413. Also, the Committee recommended that "particularly in those areas of possible conflicts of interest, such as anti-takeover proposals and compensation plans, the Commission should attempt to get better, more uniform disclosure in
proxy statements of the disadvantages as well as the advantages of management's proposals."
Id. at 416.
53

SEC STAFF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 28, at 29-30.

54 Id. at 29.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 33 ("Inevitably, the effectiveness of a corporation's board of directors and the
degree of concern and participation by its shareholders will affect the corporation's relationships with other constituencies, but the Report is, first and foremost, about accountability of
the corporation to shareholders and investors.").
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cant and controversial issues, including shareholder participation in
the corporate electoral process, the shareholder proposal rule, disclosure of socially significant information, the role of the board of directors in the corporate accountability process, and the role of
institutional investors in this process. The following discussion high57
lights some of the major issues discussed.
One issue considered by the staff was whether the Commission
should adopt a rule requiring all of the country's more than 10,000
publicly-held corporations to have audit committees composed of independent directors. A staff survey of 1,200 companies found that
85% of the companies surveyed already had audit committees and
that the majority of these committees were composed of independent
directors. In light of this finding, the staff recommended that the
Commission not proceed to consider a rule to require such audit
committees.58

Another issue considered by the staff was the extent to which
corporations used nominating committees to foster accountability in
selecting, evaluating, and reviewing nominee and incumbent directors. The staff found that only 29% of publicly-held companies, principally the larger ones, had created such committees. Despite this
percentage, the staff recommended that the Commission delay the
development of a nominating committee rule until it could assess
whether more corporations would independently initiate such committees. The staff indicated, however, that if the number of companies having independent nominating committees did not
substantially increase, it would urge the Commission to require companies to adopt procedures for considering shareholder
59
nominations.
57 For an excellent discussion of the Report, see Vandegrift, SEC Dicasses Wide Range of
Accountability Issues, Legal Times (Washington), Oct. 20, 1980, at 20, col. 1.
58 SEC STAFF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 28, at 28-29, 583. The
Report also stated:
The audit committee today has become so well established that any company
which has chosen not to establish such a committee, composed solely of directors
independent of management, should weigh carefully the costs of such a decision in
terms of liability and loss of control against the reasons, if any, for not establishing
an audit committee.
Id. at 583.
59 Id. at 57-58, 583-84. The Report continued:
It is essential to recognize. . .that under corporate statutes the power to elect the
board is vested in the shareholders, and to the extent that boards of directors are
not more forthcoming in their efforts to facilitate shareholder participation in the
electoral process, a shareholder nomination rule may be necessary.
Id. at 584. Recently, in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 18,532, 47 Fed. Reg. 10,792
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The staff also considered the adequacy of the Commission's approach to the disclosure of socially significant corporate information.
During the 1970's, the Commission increasingly was called upon to
address questions relating to the disclosure of socially significant information. 6° Although the information in question may not be economically material and although many shareholders desire solely to
maximize their investments, many shareholders are concerned that
the companies in which they have an equity interest adhere to certain minimal ethical and legal standards.6 1 With these competing
policies in focus, the Report examined the extent to which proxy
statements should disclose socially significant information, and concluded that "unless issuers know that there is a reasonable
probability that shareholders would consider information about a
particular social topic important when voting, the economic materiality standard, in conjunction with the Commission's proxy rules, are
(1982), the staff stated that in view of the "dramatic" increase in the number of nominating
committees from 19.4% of companies in 1979 to 30.4% in 1981, it "has determined not to
recommend such a rule." Id. at 10,794. It is questionable whether such an increase is "dramatic" under these circumstances. For further discussion on this point, see note 70 infia and
accompanying text.
60 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as
moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
61 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C.
1974), in which the court alluded to the qualitative nature of information relating to a corporation's environmental policy. Desiring broader SEC disclosure rules, the plaintiffs requested
the Commission to modify its corporate disclosure regulations to require each reporting company to "provide to the SEC for public disclosure information concerning the effect of its
corporate activities on the environment and statistics about its equal employment practices."
Id. at 689. With respect to the claim's environmental portion, the court discussed the relevance of the concept of materiality to the relationship between the ethical investor and
management:
There are so many so-called "ethical investors" in this country who want to invest
their assets in firms which are concerned about acting on environmental problems
of the nation. This attitude may be based purely upon a concern for the environment; but it may also proceed from the recognition that awareness of and sensitivity
to environmental problems is the mark ofintl/Zgent management. Whatever their motive, this court is not prepared to say that they are not rational investors and that
the information they seek is not material information within the meaning of the
securities laws.
Id. at 700 (emphasis added). See generaly Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, Disclosure ofInformation
Bearing on Management Integrity and Competengy, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 555, 581-98 (1981); Roiter,
Illegal CorporatePracticesand the DisclosureRequirements of the FederalSecurities Laws, 50 FORDHAM
L. REv. 781 (1982); Steinberg,Application ofthe BusinessJudgmentRule andRelatedJudicialPrtinciples-Refections from a CorporateAccountability Perspective, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 903, 912-13
(1981); Stevenson, The SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 50 (1976); Comment,
DisclosureofRegulatoq, Violations Under the FederalSecuritiesLaws Establishingthe Limits ofMateriality, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 225 (1980).
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sufficient guides to issuers in determining what socially significant
information should be disclosed in the proxy statement. '6 2 While the
63
staff's recommendation probably did not satisfy some advocates,
the Report significantly recognizes the crucial distinction between an
investment decision and a voting decision. For example, although a
corporation's antisocial conduct may not be considered material in
an investment context due to the remote possibility that economic
consequences would ensue, such conduct may be important to shareholders voting to elect directors because it reflects upon the directors'
64
integrity to assume a corporate position of trust.
Another interesting area addressed in the Staff Corporate Accountability Report was the impact of the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in FirstNationalBank of Boston v. Bellotti.65 That decision found

unconstitutional a state statute that prohibited a corporation from
expending corporate funds to publicize its views on a political referendum unless the subject matter was materially related to the corporation's business. In so holding, the Supreme Court reasoned that
shareholders could be informed of such corporate expenditures
through the process of corporate democracy.6 6 In light of that holding, the Staff Report urged the Commission to request comments on
possible ways to inform shareholders of such expenditures, including
the need for a general disclosure requirement regarding corporate
67
political activities and expenditures.
62 SEC STAFF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILrrY REPORT, supra note 28, at 234. See id. at
44-45; supra note 28.
63 See note 61 supra.
64 See Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, supra note 61, at 609. See generall Weiss, Social Regulalion ofBusinss Activity: Reforming the CorporateGovernance Sstem to Resolve an InstitutionalImpasse,
28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 343 (1981).
65 435 U.S. 765 (1978). For commentary on Bellotti, see, e.g., Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the FirstAmendment, 91 YALE LJ. 235 (1981); O'Kelley, The
ConstitutionalRights of CorporationsRevisited Social andPoliticalExpression andthe Corporationafter
First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. LJ. 1347 (1979); Rome & Roberts, Bellotti and the
First Amendment: A New Era in CorporateSpeech?, 3 CORP. L. REV. 28 (1979); Shaw, Corporate
Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas, 7 J. CORP. L. 265 (1982).
66 435 U.S. at 794 ("Ultimately shareholders may decide, through the procedures of corporate democracy, whether their corporations should engage in debate on public issues.").
67 SEC STAFF CORPORATE AccouNTABILTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 39-40, 194-202.
Another concern expressed by the staff was the role of institutional shareholders. The
staff concluded that institutions, in discharging their fiduciary duties, should exercise the voting authority that accompanies their management of securities in a manner that promotes
corporate accountability. Specifically, the staff recommended that such institutions: (1) establish formalized procedures for reaching proxy voting decisions; (2) establish voting criteria
designed to produce objective voting decisions, including criteria for reaching decisions on
matters having no investment impact; and (3) discontinue treating an uncontested election of
directors as a matter warranting an automatic vote for the slate of nominees. The staff also
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As previously stated, the Staff Corporate Accountability Report
contained no major or startling recommendations. Yet, the moderate nature of the Report says something significant about the Commission's role in the corporate governance process. Less than a
decade ago, few would have predicted that, by the end of the 1970's,
most publicly-held corporations in this country would have boards
containing a majority of outside directors and audit committees comprised solely of independent directors. 68 In the last decade, the corporate accountability framework has undergone an evolutionary
process in which the Commission's exhortatory approach played a
69
crucial role.
Although much of the Corporate Accountability Report remains viable, recent Commission actions (or inaction) signal an apparent retreat from some of the corporate accountability themes
stressed in that Report. For example, less than two years after the
Report was issued, the staff declined to recommend that the Commission promulgate a rule requiring independent nominating committees, even though the number of corporations having such
committees had only slightly increased. 70 Similarly, despite the Report's recommendation, the SEC has yet to request comments on
how to provide a means of informing shareholders of corporate political activities and expenditures. Moreover, the Commission's decision not to take action against Citicorp for failing to disclose alleged
foreign exchange trading impropriety in order to avoid foreign taxes
urged institutions to make their voting procedures and practices readily available to customers and the public. The staff sought Commission authorization to study the public availability of this information and, if necessary, to develop a legislative proposal designed to increase
disclosure in this area. Id. at 50-54, 409-25. See a/so SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 15,385,
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,766 (Dec. 6, 1978); SEC Sec. Exch. Act
Release No. 14,970, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,645 (July 18, 1978).
These releases involve the Commission's proposal, and ultimate withdrawal, of a rule requiring certain institutions subject to the SEC's proxy provisions to disclose their voting policies
and procedures in their annual reports to stockholders. The major drawback to the proposed
rule was that many large institutions, such as pension funds and banks, other than bank
holding companies, are not subject to the proxy provisions. In withdrawing the proposed
rule, however, the Commission reaffirmed its belief that "there is shareholder interest in institutional voting policies and procedures."
68 See notes 31 & 58 su/ira and accompanying text.
69 See Vandegrift, supra note 57, at 24.
70 SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 18,532 (March 8, 1982), 24 SEC Docket 1224, 1226
(March 16, 1982) (according to the 1981 results, 30.4% of companies, compared to 19.4% in
1979, had nominating committees). But see SEC STAFF CORPORATE AccOuNTABILYy REPORT, supra note 28, at 525 ("The staff's own statistics indicate that 28.9 percent of the category of all companies have nominating committees ...
-.
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and currency exchange controls 7 I has been viewed as a significant

step backward from prior SEC positions regarding management integrity. 72 Most recently, the Commission proposed "sweeping"
changes in its shareholder proposal rule, 73 some of which would enable corporations to exclude such proposals on a much easier basis
than current practice. 74 These SEC proposals stand in marked contrast to the statement contained in the Corporate Accountability Report that the rule "was operating well."' 75 Perhaps sensing this
potential reversal of policy, Commissioner Evans has defended the
current system, asserting that the shareholder proposal process "is
one of the trappings of corporate democracy, and we have to be care6
ful not to snuff out that little light [of democracy]."7
III.

SEC Disclosure

Undoubtedly, the central focus of the federal securities laws applied to publicly-held corporations is disclosure. Although crucial,
disclosure requirements are "flanked" by two other Commission
sources that affect publicly-held corporations. The first, discussed in
the preceding section, is the Commission's exhortatory approach.
The second, to be examined in the following sections, is substantive
regulation through rules and enforcement measures. 77 The present
discussion addresses the Commission's influence on corporate internal affairs from the perspective of disclosure. As will be seen, the
Commission's current approach toward disclosure appears in certain
respects to take a narrower perspective than prior practice.
Although the rationale underlying disclosure is not based primarily on influencing corporate internal affairs, but rather on providing shareholders and the marketplace with sufficient information
to make intelligent decisions and to be apprised of significant developments, there is little question that disclosure has a substantial impact on the normative conduct of corporations. 78 In this regard, the
71 See SEC Statement on Citicorp (March 5, 1982).
72 See Hudson, supra note 42; Vilkin, supra note 47. For further discussion, see notes 11221 infia and accompanying text.
73 SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 19,135 (Oct. 14, 1982).
74 Hudson, SECProposesRules Changes on Holder Votes, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1982, at 3, col.
1.
75 SEC STAFF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 28, at 133. See L. SOLOMON, R. STEVENSON & D. SCHWARTZ, CORPORATIONS 517 (1982).
76

Hudson, supra note 74.

77

See Cohen, S.E.C Power to Regulate CorporateInternalAfairs Through Disclosure, in STAN-

DARDS FOR REGULATING CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS 292 (D. Fischel ed. 1981).
78 See, e.g., L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914) ("Sunlight is said to be the
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Commission's disclosure policies, in Brandeisian manner, 79 have not
only deterred unlawful or questionable conduct, but have also helped
to establish improved standards of conduct.8 0
Certain disclosure obligations directly affect the integrity and
competency of corporate management. For example, the Commission's disclosure mandates relating to remuneration and conflicts of
interest require corporations to disclose management self-dealing.,'
Generally, Commission forms require disclosure of adjudicated illegal activities by officers and directors where such violations are matebest of disinfectants."); R. STEVENSON, CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION--SECRECY, AcCESs & DISCLOSURE 81-82 (1980) ("Today the disclosure requirements of the securities laws

are used, in a variety ofways, for the explicit purpose of influencing a wide range of corporate
primary behavior. . . .); Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at

53, 55 (disclosure has a "shrinking quality"); Sommer, Book Review, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1595,
1601 (1980) (reviewing H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION
IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979)) ("The frequency with which corporations have withheld
[disclosure of] adverse information, even when it posed the danger of Commission and private
action, suggests that if the potential sanctions were reduced at all the incidence of such withholding would increase."); Weiss, Disclosure and Corporate Accountabiliy, 34 Bus. LAw. 575

(1979) ("[O]ne of the central themes of the system by which large corporations are governed
[is] that corporate decision-making be regulated through mandatory disclosure requirements
rather than direct government intervention.").
79 See Brandeis, supra note 78.
80 See Cohen, supra note 77, at 296 ("on the positive side, if specific facts as to the independence and diligence of directors, or as to the use of special board committees or particular
types of internal controls, are required to be openly discussed, many a corporation will prefer
to report progress in these areas rather than backwardness and progress will indeed occur.").
Seealso 14 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1575-76 (Sept. 17, 1982)("Wharton Economics Professor Says SEC Disclosure Rules Benefit Economy').
81 See Item 402, Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1982); Item 404, Regulation S-K,
as adopted, SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 19,290 (Dec. 2, 1982), 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 2166 (Dec. 10, 1982). In part, Item 402 requires registrants to disclose the compensation of the five most highly paid executive officers receiving remuneration over $50,000, plus
remuneration data for all officers and directors as a group, including all remuneration proposed to be made to the officers pursuant to any existing plans. Item 404 in part requires
disclosure of transactions with the corporation by directors, director-nominees, executive of.
ficers, five percent shareholders, and members of the immediate family of the primary reporting persons involving more than $60,000 made within the past year in which such persons
have a direct or indirect material interest. In addition, Item 402 provides, with certain limitations, for a specified tabular remuneration format which requires disclosure concerning remuneration paid to certain specified persons and groups "for services in all capacities to the
registrant and its subsidiaries during the registrant's last fiscal year or, in specified instances,
certain prior fiscal years." 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(1982). The term "remuneration" includes,
interalia, salaries, fees, commissions, bonuses, securities, property, insurance benefits, and personal benefits not directly related to job performance, other than those provided to broad
categories of employees and which do not discriminate in favor of officers and directors. See
also SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 19,431 (Jan. 17, 1983) (proposing rule and schedule
amendments to the disclosure of management remuneration, including proposed amendments to Item 402).
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rial to an evaluation of the officer's or director's ability or integrity.8 2
Also, certain "events" transpiring during the previous five years that
are material to an evaluation of the competency or integrity of any
director, director-nominee, or executive officer must also be disclosed.8 3 Although the extent to which these disclosure requirements
affect corporate internal affairs is uncertain, it may be safely said that
84
they have such an impact.
Turning to rulemaking proceedings which have centered on disclosure obligations, the Commission has addressed such subjects as
the structure and role of corporate boards of directors, financial reporting and accounting developments, extraordinary events (such as
going private transactions and tender offers), and developments in
the corporation finance area. With respect to corporate boards, the
82 Set Item 401, Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (1982).
83 Id. Such "events" include:
(1) A petition under the Bankruptcy Act or any State insolvency law was filed
by or against, or a receiver, fiscal agent or similar officer was appointed by a court
for the business or property of such person, or any partnership in which he was a
general partner at or within 2 years before the time of such filing, or any corporation or business association of which he was an executive officer at or within two
years before the time of such filing;
(2) Such person was convicted in a criminal proceeding or is a named subject
of a pending criminal proceeding (excluding traffic violations and other minor offenses);
(3) Such person was the subject of any order, judgment, or decree, not subsequently reversed, suspended or vacated, of any court of competent jurisdiction permanently or temporarily enjoining him from, or otherwise limiting the following
activities:
(i) Acting as an investment adviser; underwriter, broker, or dealer in securities,
or as an affiliated person, director or employee of any investment company, bank,
savings and loan association, or insurance company, or engaging in or continuing
any conduct or practice in connection with such activity;
(ii) Engaging in any type of business practice; or
(iii) Engaging in any activity in connection with any violation of federal or
State securities laws.
(4) Such person was the subject of any order, judgment, or decree, not subsequently reversed, suspended or vacated, of any Federal or State authority barring,
suspending or otherwise limiting for more than 60 days the right of such person to
engage in any activity described in paragraph (f)(3), of this section or to be associated with persons engaged in any such activity.
(5) Such person was found by a court of competent jurisdiction in a civil action or by the Commission to have violated any Federal or State securities law, and
the judgment in such civil action or finding by the Commission has not been subsequently reversed, suspended, or vacated.
Id.
84 See generaly Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, supra note 61. Another example of a disclosure
item, Item 401(e) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (1982), requires a brief account of
the business experience of management and nominees during the prior five years.
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Commission has adopted rules that mandate disclosure of whether a
board has auditing, nominating, or compensation committees, and
that require a brief description of committee functions, the total
number of board and committee meetings held, and the identity of
directors who do not attend 75% of the total number of board or
committee meetings.8 5 The Commission declined to adopt the staff
suggestion of labeling directors as either management, affiliated nonmanagement, or unaffiliated non-management. 8 6 A corporation
must disclose, however, any substantial business and personal rela87
tions between directors and issuers.
These disclosure developments, while important, should be
viewed in conjunction with Commission exhortation and enforcement actions that obtained, as ancillary or other equitable relief, the
restructuring of corporate boards comprised of a majority of nonmanagement directors as well as the establishment of independent
audit committees.88 When viewed in their entirety, these Commission activities had the beneficial effect of inducing corporate boards
to include more outside directors and to establish audit committees.
Regarding accounting and financial reporting developments,
the most important recent development has been the enactment of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.8 9 One possible consequence of
the Act is that disclosure of the making of questionable payments
may be required, not necessarily because such payments affect corporate earnings, but because they bear on management integrity. 90
85 SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 15,384, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,766 (Dec. 6, 1978). The rule amendments also provided, inter alia, (1) that a
resigning director can submit a description of the reasons for resignation, which the issuer
must disclose, but the issuer can give its own views of the disagreement; and (2) that the issuer
must disclose the settlement terms of an election contest.
86 Id.
87 Id. Disclosure of substantial personal and business relations requires the issuer to disclose that the nominee or director is a relative of an executive officer, that the nominee or
director is a former officer or director of the issuer, that the nominee or director is an officer or
director of a customer or supplier of the issuer, and that the law firm of the nominee or
director has been retained by the issuer for the prior two years. On this last point, the Commission stated that "[i]n view of inherent conflicts faced by lawyers who serve both as directors and as counsel to corporations, the Commission is reluctant to limit disclosure of such
relationships solely on the basis of the economic test." Id. at 81,092. See a/so SEC Sec. Exch.
Act Release No. 19,290 (Dec. 2, 1982)(placing certain limitations on the foregoing disclosure
requirements).
88 For discussion of such enforcement actions and the ancillary or other equitable relief
obtained, see notes 181-89 infa and accompanying text.
89 Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977). For further discussion of the Act, see
notes 224-31 infra and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., Berman v. Gerber Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1322-23 (W.D. Mich.

THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[December 1982]

Thus, the required disclosure of questionable payments may well
have the effect of deterring the making of such payments.
An important development in the Commission's administration
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was its proposed rules which,
had they been adopted, would have mandated that corporate annual
reports contain a statement by management regarding the adequacy
of internal accounting controls. The rules would have required such
statement to be examined and reported on by an independent accountant. 91 Not surprisingly, the proposed rule generated heavy criticism and was characterized as a compliance certificate having
exorbitant costs. 92 Subsequently, the Commission declined to adopt

the proposal in order "to allow existing voluntary and private-sector
initiatives. . . to continue to develop. ' 93 In its release, however, the
Commission provided guidance to further encourage voluntary initiatives regarding internal accounting controls. This guidance may
play an influential role in improving internal accounting control
94
practices and systems.

SEC disclosure policy has affected tender offers and going private transactions. In October 1978, the Division of Corporation Finance issued a statement regarding disclosure in proxy and
1978); SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Ferrara,
Starr & Steinberg,supra note 61, at 581-90. But see Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 776-79
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1006 (1982).
91 SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 15,772, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,063 (Apr. 30, 1979).
92 See Cohen, supra note 77, at 311. See also Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 40, at
292 (the proposed rules concerning management's statement on internal accounting controls,
had they been adopted, would have generated claims of liability against accountants if management's statement was found deficient).
93 Accounting Series Release No. 278, [Accounting Series Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 72,300, at 62,791 (June 6, 1980).
94 See Cohen, supra note 77, where the author stated:
"Some guidance" amounted to many pages of elaborate exposition, including endorsement of the original objectives and coverage of some matters going beyond
what would have been included in the compulsory statements originally proposed.
The end result is that there is no SEC rule requiring any specific conduct or any
specific disclosure concerning conduct in respect of internal accounting controls,
but - an unusual case where jawboning may be said to be a triumphant end rather
than a modest beginning of the process - there is an elaborate guidebook promulgated by the SEC, not having the force of law, but perhaps affecting corporate
conduct more broadly and pervasively than a formal rule would have done.
Id. at 312. Most recently, the Commission announced that it will take no further action in
this regard. Significantly, the Commission stated: "In reaching this conclusion the Commission has considered the significant private-sector initiatives in this area, including the increased number of management reports to security holders of large companies." Accounting
Series Release No. 305, 24 SEC Docket 888 (Feb. 9, 1982), [Accounting Series Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 72,327, at 62,989 (Jan. 28, 1982).
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information statements of antitakeover or similar proposals. 95 Noting that the increased use of hostile tender offers to obtain corporate
control has prompted many companies to consider defensive techniques, the staff expressed concern over the adequacy of disclosure
made to investors when the corporation seeks shareholder approval
to amend its charter or by-laws to incorporate antitakeover or similar

proposals.9 6 Disclosure recommended by the staff included: (1) the
reasons for the antitakeover proposals and the basis for such reasons,
(2) the overall effects of the proposal, including the impact upon
management tenure, (3) the advantages and disadvantages of the

proposal, (4) a description of how the proposal will operate, (5) a
statement of whether the proposal was the subject of a vote of the
issuer's board of directors and, if so, the result of such vote, and (6)
the limitations or restrictions, if any, on the adoption of such

proposals.

97

95 SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 15,230, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,748 (Oct. 13, 1978).
96 Id. at 80,985. See Steinberg, supra note 10, at 223-24. As noted by one commentator,
although anti-takeover provisions have been challenged in a number of cases, few of these
challenges have been successful. See Labaton v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L, REP. (CCH) 96,943 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (defendant's motion for summary
judgment granted in damage suit involving company that had a supermajority provision);
Seibert v. Gulton Indus., Inc., No. 5641 (Del. Oh. June 21, 1979) (supermajority provision
held not invalid under Delaware Law); Valhi, Inc. v. PSA Inc., No. 5730 (Del. Ch. Nov. 15,
1978) (arising in context of takeover, court denied plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining
order regarding effectuation of supermajority charter amendments); Seibert v. Milton Bradley Co., No. 77-464 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 1979), afd, 405 N.E.2d 131 (1980)
(supermajority provision adopted by shareholders, with shifting vote requirement based on
board's judgment, not invalid). But see Televest, Inc. v. Olsen, No. 5768 (Del. Ch. March 8,
1979) (enjoined a dividend to common shareholders of blank check preferred stock that had
supermajority voting rights); Moran, And-Takeover Charter Changes Upheld by Courts, Legal
Times (Washington), Mar. 24, 1980, at 32, col. 1. See also In re American Inv. Co., SEC Sec.
Exch. Act Release No. 17,004, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,633, at
83,406 (§ 21 (a) Report) ("The Staff's position is that disclosure of the adoption of the By-law
Amendments was required by the tender offer provisions of the Exchange Act and rules
promulgated thereunder at the time the Board first communicated its recommendation to the
public.").
97 In particular, the staff suggested that the issuer's proxy material or information statements should disclose in a prominent place that the overall effect of the proposal is to render
more difficult the accomplishment of mergers or the assumption of control by a principal
shareholder, and thus to make difficult the removal of management. [1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,748, at 80,985. Seegeneral/{ Friedenberg,Jaws III: The Impropriety of Shark-Repel/ant Amendments as a Takeover Defenre, 7 DEL- J. CORP. L. 32 (1982).
As noted in the release, specif disclosures should be required with respect to:
supermajority voting provisions (disclosure of the acquisition by management or principal
shareholders of the power to veto any merger); classification of directors to serve staggered
terms (disclosure of the number of elections required to change the majority of the board of
directors); and authorization of certain classes of equity securities (disclosure as to whether
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The Commission's tender offer rules 98 establish several disclosure
obligations. For example, the tender offeror must promptly reveal
material changes in the information published, sent, or delivered to
shareholders.9 9 In addition, rule 14d-9 calls for the subject company
to file with the SEC a Schedule 14D-9, which requires the disclosure
of certain information, including a description of any material con-

tract, agreement, arrangement, or understanding and any actual or
potential conflict of interest between, among others, the offeror, the
subject company, and their affiliates,' 0 0 and disclosure of certain negotiations and transactions by the subject company. 10 1 Perhaps the
most pertinent provision is rule 14e-2, which requires the subject
company to publish or send to security holders a statement disclosing
its position with respect to the tender offer within ten business days of
the commencement of the tender offer by a person other than the
issuer. The statement of position can take one of three forms: (1)
recommendation or rejection of the tender offer, (2) a statement that
the subject company is unable to take a position with respect to the
tender offer, or (3) issuance of no opinion, in which case the subject
company will remain neutral toward the tender offer. The company
is required to include the reasons for its position with respect to the
tender offer, including the inability to take a position.10 2 Conclusory
the securities would be privately placed and, if such securities are to be so placed, whether the
purchasers have any affiliation with the issuer or any understanding with it as to the voting of
the shares). Id. at 80,987-88. See Rose & Collins, PorcupineProposals, 12 REv. OF Si.c. REC.
977 (1979); Steinberg, supra note 10, at 221.
98 SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 16,384, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326 (1979). In general, the
rules are grouped into two regulations, 14D and 14E. If the tender offer is subject to
§ 14(d)(1) of the Exchange Act, which concerns securities registered under § 12 of that Act or
securities of certain insurance and investment companies, both regulations are applicable. If
the tender offer is not subject to § 14(d)(1), only regulation 14E is applicable. See generally
Bloomenthal, The New Tender Offer Regimen, State Regulation, and Preemption, 30 EMORY L.J. 35
(1981).
99 SEC rule 14d-6(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6(d) (1982). According to the SEC, this rule
"comports with current practice and avoids any possible ambiguity, thus ensuring for disclosure of material information during the course of a tender offer." 44 Fed. Reg. at 70,333. See
generally Bauman, Rule lOb-5 and the Corporation'sAJnative Duy to Disclose, 67 GEo. L.J. 935
(1979); Note, Disclosure of MaterialInside Information: An Afflnative Corporate Duty?, 1980 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 795.
100 SEC Schedule 14D-9, item 3(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1982). In adopting Schedule 14D-9, the SEC "believe[d] that the disclosure elicited by the Schedule will assist security
holders in making their investment decision and in evaluating the merits of a solicitation/recommendation." 44 Fed. Reg. at 70,336.
101 SEC Schedule 14D-9, item 7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1982). See Rowe, Tender Offer
Regs." Changing the Game Rules, Legal Times (Washington), Dec. 31, 1979, at 9, col. 1.
102 SEC rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1982). Significantly, in order to comply with
the disclosure duties of rule 14e-2, a target company will be required in the Schedule 14D-9 to
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or "boilerplate" statements are not considered sufficient disclosure.103
Rule 14e-2 may have a significant effect on how target management responds to a hostile tender offer. Prior to the rule, a number of
court decisions permitted management to remain silent during the
course of a tender offer.10 4 Of course, target management rarely, if
ever, would remain silent during a hostile battle for control.t0 5 What
the rule does seemingly accomplish, however, is that it compels target
state its position and the reasons for that position. SEC Schedule 14D-9, item 4(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-101 (1982). Also, if the subject company changes its position or other material
changes occur, the subject company is required to promptly publish, send, or give to security
holders a statement disclosing the material change. See Sommer & Feller, Takeover Rules.- A
Cohesive Comprehensive Code, Legal Times (Washington), Dec. 17, 1979, at 18, col. 1.
103 SEC Schedule 14D-9, item 4(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1982). See Bloomenthal,
supra note 98, at 50-51; Steinberg, supra note 10, at 219-22.
104 See, e.g., Berman v. Gerber Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1325 (W.D. Mich. 1978)
("It is true that in general the Williams Act does not appear to impose upon the management
of a target company an affirmative duty to respond to a tender offer at all."). In regard to the
propriety of rule 14e-2, one source has commented:
The Supreme Court's interpretation [in Chris-Craft] is consistent with the duty that
Rule 14e-2 imposes upon target directors to disclose affirmatively any informative
material to the tender offer. The failure to support the imposition of such a duty is
inconsistent with the Act's goal of informing the investing public. Furthermore, a
target management disclosure duty furthers the efficient market purposes of the
Act. Information defines the fair market value of a security. When an investor
chooses between the alternatives of tendering or holding, he needs to have all material information in order effectively and efficiently to assess his alternatives. With
incomplete knowledge, the investor's decision will be inefficient.
Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Ofer, 60
B.U.L. REv. 403, 410 (1980) (footnotes omitted) (referring to Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), which held that a defeated tender offeror has no implied right of
action for damages for violations of § 14(e)).
105 See Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969), where Judge Friendly stated:
The likeness of tender offers to proxy contests is not limited to the issue of standing.
They are alike in the fundamental feature that they generally are contests. This
means that the participants on both sides act, not "in the peace of a quiet chamber,". . . but under the stresses of the marketplace. They act quickly, sometimes
impulsively, often in angry response to what they consider, whether rightly or
wrongly, to be low blows by the other side. Probably there will no more be a perfect tender offer than a perfect trial. Congress intended to assure basic honesty and
fair dealing, not to impose an unrealistic requirement of laboratory conditions that
might make the new statute a potent tool for incompetent management to protect
its own interests against the desires and welfare of the stockholders. These considerations bear on the kind of judgment to be applied in testing conduct-on both
sides-and also on the issue of materiality.
Id. at 948. Courts have frequently reaffirmed Judge Friendly's recognition of the practical
realities of battles in the tender offer and proxy setting. See, e.g., Seaboard World Airlines,
Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,877, at 95,590
(2d Cir. 1979); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1200 (2d
Cir. 1978); Ash v. LFE Corp., 525 F.2d 215, 221 (3d Cir. 1975); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300 n.19 (2d Cir. 1973); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403
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management to articulate its position in a conscientious manner,
thereby enabling shareholders to make their investment decisions after hearing all sides1 0 6 Failure by management to abide by this disclosure obligation under rule 14e-2 may result in antifraud liability
under the federal securities laws, even if a valid business purpose de10 7
fense exists under state law.
In regard to going private transactions, the most relevant Commission action has been the promulgation of rule 13e-3.10 8 In the
proposal stage, the rule required any going private transaction to be
both substantively and procedurally fair to minority shareholders. 0 9
F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968), cerl. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). See also Lynch & Steinberg, The
Legitimagi of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 901 (1979).
106 The legislative history of the Williams Act indicates that it was designed to protect the
legitimate interests of the target corporation, its management and its shareholders, and simultaneously to allow both the target and the bidder to present fairly their views to the shareholders. As the Act's sponsor Senator Harrison Williams stated: "We have taken extreme
care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person
making the takeover bid." 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams). See
Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 105, at 903-04. Apparently, however, the Supreme Court took
a more restrictive view of the Act's objective in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., where the
Court stated that "[t]he sole purpose of the Williams Act was the protection of investors who
are confronted with a tender offer." 430 U.S. at 35.
107 See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., 669 F.2d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 1981)
("[M]anipulation under the Williams Act cannot be justified by the good faith performance
of fiduciary duties."). For recent cases dealing with the business judgment rule under state
law, see Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658
(1981); Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v.
Inter-North, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir.
1980); Berman v. Gerber Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978). For a discussion of these cases, see Steinberg, supra note 10, at 245-60.
108 SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 16,075 (Aug. 8, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736 (1979) In
short, a going private transaction is one in which the controlling persons of a corporation
eliminate public shareholders while retaining their ownership of the business. In general, the
SEC's rules prohibit fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in connection
with going private transactions and prescribe filing, disclosure, and dissemination requirements as a means reasonably designed to prevent such acts or practices. See also SEC Sec.
Exch. Act Release No. 16,112 (Aug. 19, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 40,406 (1979), in which the
Commission adopted rule 13e-4, which governs an issuer's tender offer for its own securities.
In general, rule 13e-4 requires that a schedule 13E-4 be filed with the SEC, and establishes,
inter alia, disclosure, dissemination, and compliance requirements. In addition, rule 13e-4
proscribes manipulative, deceptive and fraudulent conduct in connection with issuer tender
offers. Note also that an issuer tender offer regulated by rule 13e-4 is also a going private
transaction subject to rule 13e-3; therefore it must comply with both rules. Importantly, an
issuer tender offer under state law "must be premised upon a valid business purpose consistent with the interests of the issuer's security holders and not with the primary objective of
preserving management in office." Manges, SEC Regulation of Issuer and Third-Party Tender Offers, 8 SEc. REG. L.J. 275, 278 (1981).
109 See SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 14,185 (Nov. 17, 1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090
(1977).
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Relying on Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, ' t0 several commentators
asserted that the proposal was an attempt to usurp state law."' Although adhering to the soundness of the proposal, the Commission
declined to adopt a "fairness" requirement."12 Rather, as adopted,
rule 13e-3 requires the issuer to disclose material facts about the
transaction, including whether it reasonably believes that the going private transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security holders and
the factors upon which the belief is based."13 In prescribing this requirement, the Commission has arguably focused on its disclosure
function, rather than engaging in substantive regulation. Nonetheless, by requiring such disclosure, private transactions today are quite
possibly fairer to minority shareholders than before the adoption of
the rule.' '4
110 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court held that in order to state a cause
of action under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act, deception or manipulation must be alleged. In other words, under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, "mere" breaches of
fiduciary duty that do not involve any misrepresentation or nondisclosure are not actionable.
For an analysis of Santa Fe and its progeny, see Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisalof Santa Fe:
Rule lOb-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 263 (1980).
11 See Cohen, supra note 77, at 309; Connolly, New Going-PrivateRule, 13 REv. SEC. REG.
975, 977 (1980); see also notes 108-09 supra.
112 The Commission stated that "the views expressed in the 1977 release are sound and
therefore [it] specifically affirms those views." SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 16,075 (Aug.
8, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736 (1979).
113 Id. For commentary on rule 13e-3, see, e.g., Connolly, supra note 111; Rothschild,
Going Private,Singer, and Rule ISe-S: What Are the Standardsfor Fiduciaries?,7 SEC. REC. L.J. 195
(1979); Note, Regulating Going Pivate Transactions: SEC Rule 13e-3, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 782
(1980); Comment, Rule 13e-3 and the Going-Private Dilemma: The SECs Quest for a Substantive
FairnessDoctrine, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 883 (1980). See also Note, Fairnessin Freezeout Transactions:
Observations on Coping with Going Pivate Problems, 69 Ky. L.J. 77 (1980). In a fairly recent
administrative proceeding, with the defendant neither admitting nor denying, the Commission concluded that, in a going-private transaction, "FSC's disclosure concerning 'fairness' of
the offering price was inadequate," and therefore constituted a violation of § 13e-3 and rule
13e-3. In the Matter of FSC Corp., 22 SEC Docket 1374, 1378 (June 14, 1981).
114 See Cohen, supra note 77, at 309-10. A number of commentators, however, contend
that the Commission has engaged in substantive regulation. See Comment, supra note 113, at
883-84 ("Although Rule 13e-3 does not impose an explicit substantive fairness standard on
going private transactions, the rule prescribes such rigid disclosure requirements regarding
the effects, purposes, and fairness of the transaction that a fairness objective is clearly implicit
in its objectives."). See also note 113 supra.
Responding to a number of proxy statements involving novel, multi-sale-of-assets transactions, in February, 1979, the Division of Corporation Finance issued a statement of its views
and practices in administering the proxy rules' existing disclosure requirements pertaining to
those transactions. SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 15,572 (Feb. 15, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg.
11,537 (1979). The Division expressed its concern that disclosure has not in the past "adequately highlighted the actual and potential conflicts of interest presented to management or
its affiliates in transactions such as these, which are structured in part to accommodate their
tax or estate needs and in which the purchaser also retains the management under long term
employment arrangements." Id. at 11,538-39. Accordingly, the Division recommended that,
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Although rules 14e-2 and 13e-3 were adopted during the Williams era, the present Commission generally supports these disclosure
provisions." 15 In contrast, the present Commission appears to be diverging from its predecessor regarding disclosure of qualitatively material information in the context of unadjudicated illegalities and
similar improprieties. Participating as amicus curiae in a case before
the Second Circuit which involved alleged nondisclosures of the directors' intent to thwart or violate the federal labor laws,"16 the Williams Commission stated that "it is clear that future plans of a
corporation must be disclosed where they are material and legal, and
there is no basis for concluding that disclosure obligations may be
avoided by making future illegal plans."'' 7 Most recently, however,
the present Commission refused to bring an action against Citicorp," 8 reasoning in part that "[t]he law concerning disclosure of
in appropriate cases, a Special Factors Section be included in the forepart of the proxy statement, which should discuss the following items: that the principal shareholders or management may have actual or potential conflicts of interest, with a description of the conflicts; the
sale price per share compared to the net tangible book value per share; a statement, if applicable, that the public seller may remain secondarily liable with respect to liabilities assumed;
that certain officers and directors have entered into long term employment contracts with the
purchaser and, if applicable, that they will receive increased salaries or other benefits; any
such factors in the transaction that management believes require particular attention by
shareholders in making their voting decision; and the reasons for and the effect of the proposed transaction. Id. at 11,539. In this regard, the staff noted that "it is important that
material aspects of the transaction be adequately disclosed so that shareholders may fully
appreciate the nature of the transaction for which their approval is sought." Id. The staff
also focused on employment arrangements, terms of financing, the fairness of the price offered, and the rights of shareholders under state law. Id. at 11,539-40. See also SEC Sec.
Exch. Act Release No. 16,883 (May 23, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 36,374 (1980) (reflecting the views
of the Division of Corporation Finance on disclosure in proxy contests where a principal issue
is the liquidation of all or a part of the equity of an issuer).
115 See, e.g., In the Matter of FSC Corp., 22 SEC Docket 1374 (June 14, 1981). But see
SEC Sec. Act Release No. 6,383 (March 3, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982) (adopting rules
setting forth certain thresholds for disclosure of environmental legal proceedings under Regulation S-K).
116 Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens, 475 F. Supp. 328
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980).
117 Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 17 (emphasis in
original), Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens, 638 F.2d 7 (2d
Cir. 1980). Continuing, the Commission asserted:
The very concept of disclosure may be contrary to human nature, in that management might prefer to conceal all unfavorable information about a company, including such matters as financial losses. Nevertheless, the essence of the federal
securities laws, as stated in the preamble to the Securities Act of 1933, is "to provide
full and fair disclosure."
Id. at 17-18.
118 See SEC Statement in Citicorp (March 5, 1982).
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unadjudicated allegations is unclear." 19 If this analysis reflects the
Commission's current thinking on the subject, the possibility of SEC
action in future such cases is virtually nil. Moreover, the SEC refused to take action against Citicorp on a much broader rationale,
stating that "[e]ven if [the improprieties were] established, the alleged amounts for the years in question were not material to Citicorp."' 20 Although this language is not necessarily determinative,
such language arguably rejects a corporation's duty to disclose qualitatively material information, particularly where explicit Commission rules, self-dealing, or kickbacks are not involved.' 2 ' Application
of such a standard could well signal the death knell to the bringing of
such enforcement actions where the subject directors and management did not directly benefit from the illegalities. It would also constitute a marked deviation from previously established Commission
22
policy.'
119 Id. The Commission stated that "[t]here would have been a serious possibility of court
reversal of the Commission's action, which would have been a bad precedent." The Commission stated that the allegations were not adequately established, that the Comptroller of the
Currency had concluded that no action was justified under the federal banking laws, that the
case was basically a banking or tax matter, not a securities case, and that the case was old, as
the alleged practices occurred between 1973 and 1978. Id. See 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 419 (March 10, 1982).
120 SEC Statement, supra note 71.
121 Compare Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1006
(1982), with Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 951 (1980). The Commission did, however, file a memorandum as amicus curiae in
support of the Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc in Gaines. The position taken
in the brief, filed in 1981, indicated that the Commission supported the application of the
qualitative materiality rationale in the proxy context, even when no kickbacks or self-dealing
were involved. See also SEC v. Vomado, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,377 (D.D.C. 1981) (pursuant to consent decree, Commission alleged, inter alia,
that corporate officers violated the proxy provisions by not disclosing that management countenanced off-the-books slush funds, falsification of records, and bribery).
122 According to Congressman Dingell, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (of the House Energy and Commerce Committee): "In rejecting a
recommendation to bring an enforcement action against Citicorp, the Commission overturned long-established precedents and introduced new criteria for disclosure." 14 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 1565 (Sept. 17, 1982). Congressman Dingell also opined that there has been
"a fundamental shift in the attitude of the Commission towards its responsibilities." Id. Former SEC Enforcement Director Stanley Sporkin testified before the House Subcommittee
that "an action against Citicorp was warranted. . . ." Id. at 1564. See also SEC v. Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Memorandum of Amicus Curiae,
SEC, in Support of Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Gaines v. Haughton, 645
F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981). In Schlitz, the SEC alleged that the defendant had failed to disclose
a nationwide scheme of bribing retailers of beer and malt beverages to purchase Schlitz's
products and also had failed to disclose its alleged violation of Spanish law in falsifying its
books and records regarding payments and transactions with certain Spanish corporations
described as affiliates. Denying Schlitz's motion to dismiss, the court concluded that "the
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While shareholders undeniably are primarily interested in obtaining the maximum economic return on their investments, many
are also concerned that the corporations in which they invest and the
nominees for whom they vote adhere to certain minimal ethical, social, and legal standards. 23 Allegations that defendant directors authorized, employed, or affirmatively concealed corrupt business
practices, if true, would be material to reasonable shareholders, especially if they are being asked to reelect these same directors. Disclosure of management misconduct is necessary to allow shareholders to
evaluate directors' fitness to serve as fiduciaries of the corporate
24

trust. 1

IV.

Substantive Non-Enforcement Regulation

SEC substantive regulation is most often based on a fraud or
enforcement rationale. What is sometimes lost sight of, however, is
that in pursuing its statutory mandates, the Commission frequently
premises its substantive regulation on other grounds. In this context,
the following discussion will address SEC substantive "non-enforcement" regulation that affects or influences corporate internal affairs.
As will be discussed, although the present Commission apparently
supports many of the actions previously taken, the recent promulgation of Regulation D serves as an example as to the extent to which
the Commission's focus has changed.
125
Besides addressing and developing proxy disclosure policy,
question of the integrity of management gives materiality to the matters the Commission
claims should have been disclosed." 452 F. Supp. at 830.
123 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 692-93 (D.D.C.
1974), rev'd and remanded, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also notes 61, 117 & 122 supra.
A substantial number of reasonable shareholders would often consider management's
authorization of foreign bribery or unadjudicated illegal conduct to be material to their investment and, particularly, voting decisions. See ConcernforIssues Fills Some Investors, Chicago
Tribune, Sept. 15, 1981, § 3, at 3-4 ("a recent study by Georgeson & Co., an investor relations
consultant, found that 20 per cent of a random sample of stock investors in seven companies
rated corporate social responsibility as an important factor in their investment"; such investors range "from unions and pension funds to individuals.").
Adequate and fair disclosure is the fundamental precept underlying the federal securities
laws. Disclosure of management misconduct, particularly in an election contest, lies at the
very heart of the proxy provisions. See Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, supra note 61.
124 See Johnson, The BusinessJudgmentRule: A Review of Is Appliation to the Problem ofIllegal
Foreign Payments, 6 J. CORP. L. 481, 508 (1981).
To permit nondisclosure on the broad ground that management is not disposed to reveal
such practices ignores the fact that, under well settled disclosure standards, management
must disclose much that is contrary to its interests. See Brief of the SEC, supra note 117 and
accompanying text. See also note 61 supra.
125 See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
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the Commission has also engaged in substantive regulation of proxy
disclosure. Perhaps most notably, the Commission in November
1979 promulgated rules which require that shareholders be provided
with a form of proxy that (1) contains the names of persons nominated to the board of directors, (2) permits shareholders to withhold
authority to vote for each nominee for election as a director (or to
vote against each nominee in those jurisdictions so permitting), (3)
permits shareholders to specify, by boxes, a choice to approve, disapprove, or abstain with respect to each matter to be acted upon, and
(4) indicates whether the proxy is solicited on behalf of the issuer's
board of directors or on behalf of persons opposing the issuer's solicitation. 26 In addition, the proxy may allow a shareholder to grant
authority to vote for nominees set forth as a group, provided that
there is a similar means to withhold such authority (or to vote against
such nominees in those jurisdictions so permitting). These rules,
based on the Commission's broad rulemaking authority under section 14(a), enable shareholders to participate more actively in the
corporate decisionmaking process. By providing shareholders with
the right to abstain or vote against matters in both election and other
contests, these rules also may have the indirect effect of promoting
revitalized shareholder interest. The ultimate result may be that
otherwise recalcitrant management will be more circumspect in selecting questionable director-nominees or putting forth contemplated
proposals of dubious benefit to the corporation, due to apprehension
that a significant percentage of shareholders will disapprove or abstain or that a lawsuit based on the contemplated nomination or
27
transaction will ensue.
126 SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 16,356 (Nov. 23, 1979), [July-Dec.] SEc. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 530, at F-i (Nov. 28, 1979). Also of interest in this regard is rule 14a-8, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1982), the stockholder proposal rule. Although the Commission's justification for the rule is principally based on fraud, see HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on HR 1493, H.R, 1821, and H.R. 2019, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 169-71
(1943), "it is clear that, over the years, the rule has come to carry a substantial amount of
corporate governance baggage as well." Cohen, supra note 77, at 313. For commentary on
rule 14a-8, see Black & Sparks, SEC Rule 14a-8 Some Changes in the Way the SEC Staflnterbretr
the Rule, 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 957 (1980); Curzan & Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate Democracy:
ControlofInvestment Manager's Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 HARV. L. REv. 670,
672-75 (1980); Eisenberg, CurrentApplications ofthe ShareholderProposalRule, 15 REv. SEc. REG.
903 (1982); BusinessJudgment Rule and Corporate Governance are Focus of PLI Institute on Securities
Regulation, [July-Dec.] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 578, at A-7 (Nov. 12, 1980). Regarding the proposed SEC changes to the shareholder proposal rule, see notes 73-76 supra and
accompanying text.
127 Such lawsuits may be based on breach of fiduciary duty under state law or a failure
adequately to disclose under federal law. For a discussion of relevant case law, see Ferrara &
Steinberg, supra note 110.
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The SEC has also engaged in substantive "nonenforcement"
regulation in the tender offer setting. In November 1979, the Com129
1 28
mission adopted new tender offer rules, including rule 14d-2(b).
Rule 14d-2(b) generally provides that an announcement of an intent
to make a tender offer, disclosing the amount of shares sought to be
purchased and the price to be offered, triggers the commencement of
a tender offer.1 30 The rule's effect is to preempt many of the state
takeover statutes that provide for a significant precommencement
waiting period and require a hearing to be held before a tender offer
131
can commence.
128 SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 16,348 (November 16, 1979), noted in [July-Dec.] SEc.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 529, at A-24 (Nov. 21, 1979).
129 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1982).
130 More specifically, the material terms that trigger rule 14d-2(b) include the identity of
the bidder and target corporation, disclosure of the class and amount of securities that are
sought, and a statement of the price or range of prices being offered. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d2(c)(1982). The rule, however, provides a grace period of five days for the bidder to file the
requisite information with the SEC and disseminate such information to shareholders. As
aptly explained by one source:
If. . . a bidder makes a public announcement through a press release, newspaper
advertisement or public statement setting forth only the bidder's and subject company's identity, the amount and class of securities being sought, and the consideration being offered therefore, and then Rule 14d-2(b) provides that the tender offer
shall not be deemed to commence on that date if within five business days the
bidder either publicly announces that the tender offer has been discontinued or files
a Schedule 14D-1 and disseminated the requisite information to security holders.
In the latter case, the date of commencement is the date on which the requisite
information is first disseminated. A public announcement by a bidder disclosing
only his and the subject company's identity and a statement that he intends to
make a tender offer in the future, without specifying the amount of securities involved or the consideration therefore, does not constitute the commencement of a
tender offer.
Sommer & Feller, Takeover Rules: A Cohesive Comprehensive Code, Legal Times (Washington),
Dec. 17, 1979, at 18-19.
131 The adoption of rule 14d-2(b) has added to "[t]he confrontation between state requirements and federal law ..
" Bloomenthal, supra note 98, at 58. At the time it adopted the
rule, the SEC recognized the conflict with state laws:
Thus, the conflict between Rule 14d-2(b) and such state statutes is so direct
and substantial as to make it impossible to comply with both sets of requirements as
they presently exist. While recognizing its long and beneficial partnership with the
states in the regulation of securities transactions, the Commission nevertheless believes that the state takeover statutes presently in effect frustrate the operation and
purposes of the Williams Act and that. . . Rule 14d-2(b) is necessary for the protection of investors and to achieve the purposes of the Williams Act.
SEC Sec. Act. Release No. 6,158, Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 16,384, [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,584 (Nov. 29, 1979) (footnote omitted). In
response to rule 14d-2, some states have taken legislative action in an attempt to harmonize
their regulatory requirements with those of the Williams Act. Such states include Indiana,
Maryland, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. See Bloomenthal, supra note 98, at 59-60;
Indiana, Nevada and Penmylvania Take Action to Meet Takeover Law Challenges, [Jan.-June] SEC.
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In promulgating rule 14d-2(b), the SEC relied on its broad
rulemaking authority under section 14(d) as well as other provisions. 132 The Commission reasoned that the rule was necessary to
protect investors and to effectuate the purposes underlying the Williams Act. 13 3 According to the Commission, once a contemplated
tender offer is announced at a price significantly higher than the then
prevailing market price, shareholders are confronted with the immediate investment decision of either selling in the rising market or
holding their stock in the hope that the offer will be successful.
Under such circumstances, "[p]rotection of investors requires that
when confronted with these decisions, the shareholders have the protection of the Williams Act, including full disclosure concerning the
offer, and the opportunity to accept it rather than being held in
limbo for some considerable period of confusion before the offer is
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 605, at F-1 (May 27, 1981). One such route toward possible
harmonization has been described as follows:
Although some states appear determined to fight out the Rule 14d-2 battle, they
have little to lose by adopting the Wisconsin approach which permits the offer to go
forward but precludes the tender offer from being concluded until the state commissioner has had an opportunity to review it under the appropriate state standards. The SEC's staff has said that it does not object to conditioning a tender offer
on such a review. In that event, the constitutionality of state tender offer legislation
will have to be determined in the general context of whether the state statutes
which tip the balance between bidder and the target differently from the Williams
Act conflict with the Williams Act, and whether the extraterritorial application of
such statutes imposes an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
Bloomenthal, supra note 98, at 61-62. The constitutionality of rule 14d-2 has not been definitively settled. A number of courts, however, have upheld the validity of the rule and accordingly have held that the applicable state takeover statute was preempted. See, e.g., Hi-Shear
Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804 (D.S.C.
1980). In a recent decision, the Supreme Court, in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S.Ct. 2629
(1982), held the Illinois Business Takeover Act unconstitutional under the commerce clause.
See generaly Langevoort, State Tender Ofer Legislation: Interests, Ericl, and PoliticalCompeteny,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 213 (1977).
132 The Commission also relied on §§ 3(b), 14(e), and 23(a) of the Exchange Act. See SEC
Sec. Act Release No. 6,158,supra note 131; Brief of the SEC as Amicus Curiae, GM Sub Corp.
v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 98, at 15 (D. Del. filed April 24, 1980).
133 The Commission stated:
Such pre-commencement public announcements cause security holders to make investment decisions with respect to a tender offer on the basis of incomplete information and trigger market activity normally attendant to a tender offer, such as
arbitrageur activity. Since they constitute the practical commencement of a tender
offer, such pre-commencement public announcements cause the contest for control
of the subject company to occur prior to the application of the Williams Act and
therefore deny security holders the protections which that Act was intended by
Congress to provide.
SEC Release, supra note 131, at 82,582-83 (footnote omitted).
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34

Rule 14d-2(b) may help to neutralize the advantage that target
management enjoyed under these state takeover statutes. State statutes, particularly those providing for extensive precommencement
delays or for substantive fairness determinations, gave the subject
company time to implement defensive measures and to find a "white
knight."' 35 Thus, rule 14d-2(b) may have a significant impact on a
target corporation's internal processes when it is the subject of a hostile tender offer.
One of the more significant measures that the SEC has recently
taken in "nonenforcement" substantive regulation has been to re1 36
quire a majority of a registrant's directors to sign the Form 10-K.
In adopting this measure as part of its integration package, 3 7 the
Commission reasoned that the shift in emphasis toward relying on
periodic disclosure under the 1934 Act demands that the attention of
the private sector, including directors and professionals, must also be
.refocused toward Exchange Act filings. Such increased attention to
Exchange Act filings is needed to instil adequate discipline for the
integrated system to properly function. By implementing the signature requirement, the Commission "anticipate[d] that directors will
be encouraged to devote the needed attention to reviewing the Form
10-K and to seek the involvement of other professionals to the degree
38
necessary to give themselves sufficient comfort."'
The effect of the signature requirement on directors' standard of
care in reviewing the Form 10-K and on their reliance on counsel
and accountants should be substantial. By signing the Form 10-K,
134 SEC Brief, supra note 132, at 20. See note 112 supra.
135 Seegenerally Langevoort, supra note 131. Such a consequence appears to be contrary to
the purposes underlying the Williams Act. Both the House and Senate Reports stated that
the bill "is designed to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the
same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their
case." H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2811, 2813; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
136 See SEC Sec. Act Release No. 6,231 (Sept. 2, 1980), [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) No. 569, at SS-3 (Sept. 10, 1980).
137 Id. These amendments are designed to facilitate integration of the Securities Act and
Exchange Act disclosure systems. The annual report to shareholders, under the amendments,
may become the cornerstone disclosure document upon which the integrated system is to be
built.
138 No. 569 at SS-7. The Commission concluded that "this added measure ofdiscipline is
vital to the disclosure objectives of the federal securities laws, and outweighs the potential
impact, if any, of the signature on legal liability." Id. The Commission did state, however,
that "[i]t has. . . instructed the staff to report to it on the results of imposing the requirement
after an appropriate time has passed, and the Commission will revisit the question if such
action appears necessary or appropriate at that time." Id.
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the subject directors have presumably reviewed the document with
care. 3 9 Accordingly, increased liability upon such directors may be
premised on the following rationales: (1) that under section 18(a) of
the Exchange Act,'14 the directors "caused" the filing;' 41 (2) that
such signing indicates that the directors may have acted with scienter,' 42 or at least recklessly,' 4 3 for recovery purposes in private damage and SEC injunctive actions under section 10(b)' 44 and at least
negligently in SEC injunctive actions under section 17(a)(2) and
17(a) (3) of the Securities Act;' 45 and (3) that, with respect to control
person liability under section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 4 6 such signing may indicate that the subject directors did not act in good faith
and may have induced the acts causing the violation.' 47 Although
the courts may ultimately reject the above rationales, thereby signifying that the signature requirement may not alter existing legal liabili139 See Ferrara, Current Issues Between Corporations and Shareholders: FederalIntervention Into
Corporate Governance, 36 Bus. LAw. 759, 766 (1981).
140 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
141 Section 18(a) imposes liability upon any person "who shall make or cause to be made"
any materially false or misleading statement contained in a document filed with the SEC.
Relief may be granted only to purchasers and sellers. Strict standards of reliance and causation apply, with the result that, in no reported case, has the plaintiff obtained relief. See
Greene, Determining the Responsibilities of UnderwritersDistributingSecurities Within an Integrated
Disclosure System, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 755, 758 (1981). For discussion on § 18(a), see Steinberg, The Proprietpand Scope ofCumulative Remedies Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 557 (1982).
142 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976), and SEC v. Aaron, 446
U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980), the Court defined scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud." See generally Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Defne
Scienter Under Rule lOb-5: Ernest & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1977).
143 The Court in both Hochfelder and Aaron expressly left this issue open. See 446 U.S. at
686 n.5; 425 U.S. at 194 n.12. Subsequent to Hochfelder, the overwhelming majority of courts
have held that recklessness constitutes sufficient scienter. See, e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d
1017 (6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970
(1978); Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039
(1978). See general'y Steinberg & Gruenbaum, Variationson "Recklessness"After Hochfelder and
Aaron, 8 SEc. REG. L.J. 179 (1980).
144 In Aaron, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the SEC must
prove scienter in SEC injunctive actions brought for violations of§ 10(b) and § 17(a)(1) of the
Securities Act. In Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Court held that scienter must be shown
in private damage actions under § 10(b).
145 In Aaron, the Court held, inter alia, that the SEC need not prove scienter in injunctive
actions based on violations of § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3). See Steinberg, SECand Other Permanent
Injunctions--Standardsfor Their Imposition, Modiftation, andDissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 27
(1980).
146 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976).
147 See Ferrara, supra note 139, at 766.
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ties,1 48 the signature requirement will likely impel directors to
examine and review the Form 10-K and to rely on corporate counsel
and accountants to a much greater extent than has previously been
the practice.
A further issue relating to SEC "non-enforcement" substantive
regulation is whether the Commission has the authority under section 19(c) of the Exchange Act 149 to compel self-regulatory organizations to alter their listing standards that relate to the internal
corporate affairs of listed companies. In the Corporate Governance
Report, the staff contended that Commission authority under section
19(c) seems clear on its face. The Report stated that the exchanges'
listing standards, including provisions such as the New York Stock
Exchange's audit committee rule, currently affect the internal governance of listed companies by requiring such companies to take corporate action that they may not otherwise pursue.' 50 While the
listing standards of individual exchanges may become less important
in the context of a national market system, the staff observed that the
Commission's authority under section 19(c) extends to all national
securities exchanges as well as to the National Association of Securities Dealers. In addition, the staff noted that the Commission has
broad and direct rulemaking power under section 11A(a) (2) of the
Exchange Act ' to designate the securities or classes of securities that
52
are deemed qualified for trading in the national market system. 1 If
148 See note 138 supra.
149 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1976). Pursuant to § 19(c), the Commission "by rule, may
abrograte, add to, and delete from. . . the rules of a self-regulatory organization. . . as the
Commission deems necessary or appropriate to insure the fair administration of the self-regulatory organization, to conform its rules to requirements of this chapter and the rules and
regulations thereunder applicable to such organization, or otherwise in furtherance of pur"
poses of this chapter....
150

SEC STAFF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 28, at 643-44.

151

15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(2) (1976).

152 SEC STAFF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 28, at 646. In this
regard, the Staff concluded that self-regulatory organizations
are confronted with somewhat of a dilemma between their marketing efforts to
attract companies to list or otherwise qualify their securities for trading and their
regulatory efforts to enhance investor confidence through corporate accountability

requirements. Thus, while they cannot be expected to be at the forefront of
changes in corporate accountability, they should continue to be concerned about
the governance of their listed companies and can play an important role in assuring
communication among their listed companies, their member firms and shareholders.
The Commission, for its part, should consider carefully further suggestions for
SRO rule changes related to the internal corporate structure of listed companies,
but, as a matter of policy, should not require such changes at this time.

Id. at 647.
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criteria for qualification were to extend to conduct of corporate internal affairs, and not merely suitability for trading, the Commission's
leverage "to move the world of corporate governance" would be even
stronger.1 53 It seems highly unlikely, however, that the present Commission would move in this direction.
Indeed, an argument can be made that the current Commission
has exhibited considerable concern for facilitating the capital formation process. The recent adoption of Regulation D, particularly certain aspects of rule 506 contained therein,1 54 reflects this concern.
Essentially, Regulation D contains new rules which govern certain
offers and sales of securities without registration under the Securities
Act.' 55 One such rule, rule 506, replaces rule 146156 and relates to
153 See Cohen, supra note 77, at 314-16. See also Comment, Stock Exchange Listing Agreements
as a Vehiclefor Corporate Governance, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1427 (1981).
154 Rule 506 is one of six rules adopted by the Commission pursuant to Regulation D. As.
outlined by the Commission:
Rules 501-503 set forth definitions, terms, and conditions that apply generally
throughout the regulation. The exemptions of Regulation D are contained in
Rules 504-506. Rules 504 and 505 replace Rules 240 and 242, respectively, and
provide exemptions from registration under Section 3(b) ofthe Securities Act. Rule
506 succeeds Rule 146 and relates to transactions that are deemed to be exempt
from registration under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act.
SEC Sec. Act Release No. 6,389 (March 8, 1982), 14 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 495, 496
(March 17, 1982).
155 As stated previously, rules 504 and 505 were promulgated pursuant to § 3(b) of the
Securities Act, which empowers the Commission to exempt from the registration requirements any issue of securities provided that the aggregate amount at which the issue is offered
to the public does not exceed $5,000,000. Under rule 504, securities not exceeding $500,000
may be sold during any twelve-month period to an unlimited number of investors. The rule
contains no specific disclosure requirements and is available only to companies that are
neither subject to reporting obligations under the Exchange Act nor defined as investment
companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Under rule 505, an issuer may sell up
to $5,000,000 of securities during any twelve-month period to thirty-five purchasers and to an
unlimited number of accredited investors. The rule contains certain informational delivery
requirements and prohibits the use of general advertising or solicitation. See note 154 supra.
For discussion of rule 506, see notes 158-59 infta and accompanying text.
156 The Commission adopted rule 146 in 1974. SEC Sec. Act Release No. 5,487 (April 23,
1974). Until recently, the Commission had continued to support the rule. See, e.g., SEC Sec.
Act Release No. 5,913, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,532 (March 6,
1978). As stated by the Commission in that release:
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides that offers and sales of securities
by an issuer not involving any public offering are exempt from the registration
provisions of the Act. Rule 146 provides objective standards for determining when
the exemption is available. The main conditions of the rule require that (1) there
be no general advertising or soliciting in connection with the offering; (2) offers be
made only to persons the issuer reasonably believes have the requisite knowledge
and experience in financial and business matters or who can bear the economic risk;
(3) sales be made only to persons as described above except that persons meeting
the economic risk test must also have an offeree representative capable of providing
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transactions that are exempt under section 4(2) of the Securities
Act. 57 Under rule 506, offers and sales are exempt from registration
when the securities are purchased by no more than thirty-five purchasers. Accredited investors, including individuals meeting certain
financial standards, 5 8 are excluded in computing the number of purchasers. The rule eliminates the economic risk test and requires that
only purchasers meet the sophistication standard. 5 9
The Commission's release in adopting Regulation D makes clear
that rule 506 transactions are deemed to be exempt under section
4(2).160 As the Supreme Court in an analogous situation held in Ernst
&Ernst v. Hochfelder,16 1 the rule's scope cannot exceed that given to
its statutory source.' 6 2 Viewed from this perspective, a plausible, if
the requisite knowledge and experience; (4) offerees have access to or be provided
information comparable to that elicited through registration; (5) there be no more
than 35 purchasers in the offering; and (6) reasonable care be taken to ensure that
the securities are not resold in violation of the Act's registration provisions.
Id. at 80,171. Examples of further discussion on rule 146 as well as former rules 240 and 242
include Deaktor, IntegrationofSecarities Ojirings, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 465 (1979); Schneider, The
Statutoty Law of Private Placements, 14 SEc. REG. REV. 869 (1981); Soraghan, th'vate Offerings:
Determining "Access," "Investment Sophistication,"and "Ability to Bear Economic Risk, " 8 SEc. REG.
L.J. 3 (1980); Thomforde, ExemptionsJfom SEC Registrationfor Small Businesses, 47 TENN. L.
REv. 1 (1979). For discussion of § 4(6) of the Securities Act, see note 220 infa.
157 Section 4(2) states that the provisions of § 5 shall not apply to "transactions by an
issuer not involving any public offering." See note 154supra. Note that under § 19(c)(3)(C) of
the Securities Act the Commission is empowered to adopt for federal securities law purposes
"a uniform exemption from registration for small issuers which can be agreed upon among
several States or between the States and the Federal Government." Significantly, the Commission did not rely on this provision as the basis for promulgating rule 506. This position is
correct. Even if the rule were ultimately adopted by some states, rule 506, unlike the exemptive authority provided by § 19(c)(3)(C), applies to all issuers regardless of size.
158 Rule 501 defines an "accredited investor" to include, among others, any person who
purchases at least $150,000 of the securities if the total purchase price does not exceed twenty
percent of the person's net worth at the time of sale, any natural person who has an income
greater than $200,000 during each of the prior two years and who reasonably anticipates an
income greater than $200,000 for the current year, and any natural person whose net worth,
individually or in combination with the spouse, at the time of purchase is $1,000,000. See
SEC Release, supra note 154, at 498-99.
159 Id. at 503. Cf. rule 146, supra note 156.
160 See note 149 supra.
161 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (concluding that despite the language of rule lOb-5, which could
be read as not requiring scienter, the language of § 10(b) was controlling and required
scienter).
162 By its terms, however, § 4(2) does not confer rulemaking authority upon the Commission. It would appear that § 19(a) of the Securities Act gives the Commission that authority:
The Commission shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this title, including rules and regulations governing registration statements and prospectuses for various classes of securities and issuers, and defining accounting, technical, and trade terms used in this title.
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not persuasive, argument can be made that rule 506 is invalid because it contravenes established judicial construction of section 4(2),
dating back nearly thirty years to the Supreme Court's seminal decision in SEC v. Ralston-Purina Co. 163 Under such judicial interpretation, courts have uniformly held that the section applies not only to
purchasers but to offerees as well, 64 and that the financial sophistication or wealth of an offeree is not a sufficient basis for a subject issuer
rule
to qualify for the exemption. 65 By deleting these requirements,
66
authorityt
Commission's
the
506 arguably exceeds
Moreover, promulgation of rule 506 will provide certain inves15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1976).
163 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (the § 4(2) exemption turns on, inter alia, whether the offerees were
able to fend for themselves and whether they had access to the kind of information that
registration would have disclosed).
164 See, e.g., SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980); Swenson v. Engelstad, 626 F.2d
421 (5th Cir. 1980); Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Asset Management Corp., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,278 (S.D. Ind. 1979);
Barrett v. Triangle Mining Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,438 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Cf. ALI FEDERAL SECURTIEs CODE § 202(41)(B) (focusing on the
number of purchasers rather than offerees).
165 See, e.g., Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978); Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises,
Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967).
166 Indeed, in 1975, the American Bar Association's Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law stated that the Commission's administrative authority with respect to the § 4(2)
exemption "is somewhat circumscribed by relevant judicial decisions." Section 4(2) and Statuto,7 Law-A Position Paperof the FederalRegulation ofSecurities Committee, 31 Bus. LAw. 483, 486
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Position Paper]. Interestingly, the Commission's former rule 146
was apparently more restrictive than the statutory case law construing § 4(2). As the Fifth
Circuit stated:
[Rule 146] is more restrictive than the cases in this Circuit in that it requires that
the offeree either be sophisticated or advised by an offeree representative who is, in
addition to the requirement that offerees receive or have access to information that
registration would disclose. Moreover, the requirement that the offerees be able to
bear the economic risk of the investment is one that our cases never dealt with.
Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 612 n.14 (5th Cir. 1975), vacatedandremanded on other
grounds, 426 U.S. 944 (1976). See Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 902
(5th Cir. 1977); Schneider, supra note 156, at 874-75. But see Position Paper, supra, at 491
("[U]nder Statutory Law as well as Rule 146, we believe that both the total amount of
money invested, and also the likelihood that all or part of it will be lost, must be considered.");N AA Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 834,835-36,
836 n.7 (May 7, 1982) (requiring, unlike rule 506, that for an accredited investor as discussed
above, "the issuer and any person acting on its behalf shall have reasonable grounds to believe and after making reasonable inquiry shall believe that the purchaser either alone or with
his/her purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he/she is or they are capable of evaluating the merits and risk of the prospective investment and that the investment does not exceed 20% of the investor's net worth
(excluding principal residence, furnishings therein and personal automobiles)." The exemption does provide, however, that "[i]n those states where facts and circumstances permit, it
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tors with far less protection than they previously had enjoyed. The
Fourth Circuit's decision in Lawler v. Gilliam 167 graphically illustrates
this consequence. In Lawler, 100 investors lost approximately
$2 1,000,000.168 The defendants claimed that the private offering ex-

emption of section 4(2) was available. The Fourth Court disagreed,
relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Ralston Purina as well as a
long line of federal appellate cases.16 9 Accordingly, investors' status
as wealthy or financially sophisticated was not sufficient for the exemption to apply. The court recognized that such status "is not a
substitute for 'access to the kind of information which registration
would disclose,' 170 and held the defendants liable under section
12(1) of the Securities Act.1 7 1 In contrast, under the SEC's rule 506,
the defendants in Lawler apparently could have successfully claimed
the exemption, thereby precluding the plaintiffs from their section
12(1) remedy. The plaintiffs apparently would have been considered
would not be inconsistent with the regulatory objectives of this exemption to omit this section.').
Some commentators also have implied that rule 506 exceeds the Commission's statutory
authority. See Note, Regulation D.- Coherent Exemptionsfor Small Businesses Under the SecuritiesAct
of 1933, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 121, 156 (1982) ("By extending the accredited investor
concept to Rule 506 . . . the SEC authorizes issuers to sell large amounts of unregistered
securities without requiring specific disclosure to investors who may lack access to information. This results in a definition of 'nonpublic offering' that is inconsistent with case law
interpreting section 4(2).'). See also Donahue, New Exemptions fiom the RegistrationRequirements
of the Securities Act of 1933: Regulation D, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 235 (1982); Ketels, Regulation DThe New Regulation Worldfor Limited Offerings, 5 CORP. L. REv. 268 (1982); Schneider, Introduction to Regulation D, 15 REv. SEC. REG. 990 (1982).
167 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978).
168 Id. at 1290.
169 Id. at 1289-91 (citing SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Custer Channel
Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.
1959)).
170 569 F.2d at 1289 (quoting United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675,
678 (4th Cir. 1967), quoting SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953)). Accord
Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 902 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[E]vidence of a
high degree of business or legal sophistication on the part of all offerees does not suffice to
bring the offering within the private placement exemption.").
171 569 F.2d at 1289-91. Section 12(1) provides that "[a]ny person who offers or sells a
security in violation of section 5 . . . shall be liable to the person purchasing such security
from him ..
" Some courts have limited liability under § 12 to only those persons who are
in privity with the aggrieved purchaser. See, e.g., McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp.
631, 647-48 (N.D. Cal. 1980). The Fifth Circuit in Lawler rejected this rationale, holding that
liability may be imposed under § 12 upon those who are integrally connected with or substantially involved in the offer or sale. 569 F.2d at 1287-88 (following Lewis v. Walston &
Co., 487 F.2d 617, 621-22 (5th Cir. 1973)). In addition, some courts have premised liability
under the section on an aiding and abetting basis. See general4 Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605
F.2d 110, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1979).
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"accredited investors" as defined in Regulation D.17 2 Because rule
506 presumes that such investors can fend for themselves, 173 the
plaintiffs would not be entitled to delivery of any information.
Rule 506's departure from established case law construing section 4(2) as well as the Commission's own prior rules 174 calls into
question whether the rule will ultimately be upheld by the courts.
Rule 506, perhaps more than any other recent SEC action, with the
possible exception of temporary "shelf' registration rule 415,175
brings into focus the apparently changed philosophy at the Commission, at least with respect to its concern for the capital raising process. 176 Although promotion of the capital formation process is
certainly a laudable objective, Congress was far more concerned with
172 Since investors lost an average of $210,000 each, this conclusion seems supportable.
The decision, however, does not discuss each investor's loss. For Regulation D's definition of
"accredited investor," see rule 501 and note 158 supra.
173 See rule 502 (b), SEC Release, supra note 154, at 500-01.
174 See notes 156 and 166 supra and note 178 inra.
175 The Commission's adoption of rule 415, the temporary "shelf" registration rule, SEC
Sec. Act Release No. 6,383, 24 SEC Docket 1318 (March 16, 1982), and the Commission's
subsequent extension of that rule, SEC Sec. Act Release No. 6,423, 12 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 1593 (Sept. 17, 1982), have come under attack. Generally, rule 415 governs the registration of securities to be offered and sold on a delayed or continuous basis in the future.
Significantly, for the first time, the rule permits primary at-the-market offerings of equity
securities which the issuer expects to offer within two years of the registration statement's
effective date. Following public hearings and comment regarding rule 415, the Commission
extended the effective period for the rule until December 31, 1983, to obtain additional experience before taking final action on the rule. SEC Sec. Act Release No. 6,423 (Sept. 2, 1982).
Arguing that the rule should be limited to debt offerings, Commissioner Thomas dissented.
She asserted that rule 415, when applied to equity offerings,
jeopardizes the liquidity and stability of our primary and secondary securities markets by encouraging greater concentration of underwriters, market-makers, aid
other financial intermediaries and by discouraging individual investor participation
in the capital markets thereby furthering the trend toward institutionalization of
securities holders, and (2) reduces the quality and timeliness of disclosure available
to investors when making their investment decisions. Incurring these risks is antithetical to the statutory duty of the Commission to protect investors and to maintain the integrity of our capital markets.
14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 1597. An even more critical view is held by John C.
Whitehead, senior partner of Goldman, Sachs & Co., who criticized the rule in the following
terms: "There have been times when its zealous protection of the interests of investors have
seemed to make it unduly difficult for corporations to raise needed capital. But now the
Commission has seemingly taken a 180-degree turn, abandoning its traditional role of protecting investors . . . " Whitehead, SEC Abandons Investor Protection, FINANCIER (CORRESPONDENCE), Apr. 1982, at 59, 60. See generally Ferrara & Sweeney, ShefRegitration UnderSEC
Temporaq Rule 415, 5 CORP. L. REV. 308 (1982).
176 A former SEC Commissioner has recommended that the preambles of the 1933 and
1934 Acts be amended to elevate the promotion of the capital formation process as one of the
Commission's specified objectives. R. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA 298-304 (1982). See
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the SEC's role in protecting the investing public and the integrity of
the marketplace. 177 Accordingly, the Commission's promulgation of
rule 506, although perhaps beneficial by replacing the cumbersome
and much criticized rule 146,178 goes too far in facilitating capital
formation at the expense of the investing public.
V.

Enforcement

During the 1970's, the trilogy of (1) the Commission's enforcement program, (2) the voluntary disclosure program, and (3) the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act had a profound collective impact on
corporate accountability. The enforcement program in the area of
questionable payments is well known and need not be detailed
here. 179 Equally well known are the many cases brought for violations involving other misconduct.1 80 These and other cases were
brought, however, to respond to perceived wrongdoings and specific
deficiencies, and not with an aim to influence internal corporate affairs. While the Commission sought in such cases the express statutory remedy of an injunction against future violations, the
Commission also obtained a variety of ancillary or other equitable
relief. Such relief was designed to establish mechanisms by which to
Klein, Karmes "Good Book" Flawed by Rhetorical Excess, Legal Times (Washington), Apr. 5,
1982, at 13, col. 1.
177 See Preamble to the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74
(1933) ("To provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and
foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for
other purposes."); Preamble to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) ("To provide for the regulation of securities exchanges
and over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the
mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets, and for
other purposes."). Interestingly, when Congress amended the Securities Act in 1980, it urged
"greater Federal and State cooperation in securities matters, including. . . minimum interference with the business of capital formation . . . ." 15 U.S.C.A. § 77s(c)(2)(C) (West 1981)
(emphasis added). The term "interference" is far different than the terms "facilitating" or
"encouraging," which Congress could have elected to employ.
178 Thus, rule 146 was subject to two major criticisms: "(1) It [did] not relieve all ambiguity and uncertainty regarding the necessary requirements for the private placement exemption, and (2) full compliance with the Rule [was] a time consuming and financially expensive
procedure." Thomforde, supra note 156, at 21. See also note 156 supra. As noted beforehand,
former rule 146 apparently was more restrictive than the statutory case law construing § 4(2).
See note 166 supra. Whether or not the courts ultimately uphold rule 506, the rule's adoption
by the Commission may in itself represent a change in focus.
179 See SEC QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 25.
180 See generaly Hazen, Administrative Enforcement: An Evaluation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's Use of Injunctions and OtherEnforcement Methods, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 428 (1979)
(exploring the "SEC's exercise of enforcement authority both in terms of efficiency and the
legal standards applying that authority.").
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avoid repetition of the questionable conduct. In this process, the
Commission influenced internal corporate mechanisms, sometimes
18
dramatically. For example, corporate boards were restructured, '
82
independent directors were appointed, audit and other committees
were established, 8 3 and corporate officials were removed or ordered
84
not to serve in public companies.
While the SEC has often procured ancillary or equitable relief
through the consent negotiation process,'8 5 usually with the defendant neither admitting nor denying the allegations of the complaint, 8 6 the Commission has also obtained these orders through
litigation.8 7 In addition, pursuant to section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act,' 8 8 the Commission through the administrative process
has obtained far-reaching relief that affects internal corporate
processes. 18 9 The Commission has also affected internal corporate
181 See, e.g., SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
94,807 (D.D.C. 1974); SEC v. Westgate Cal. Corp., SEC Litig. Release No. 6,142 (S.D. Cal.

1973).
182 See, e.g., SEC v. The Fundpack, Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(COH) 97,125 (D.D.C. 1979); SEC v. Marlene Indus., Inc., SEC Litig. Release No. 8,733
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); SEC v. Inflight Services, Inc., SEC Litig. Release No. 8,182 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
183 See, e.g., SEC v. International Systems & Controls Corp., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,207 (D.D.C. 1979); SEC v. Aydin Corp., [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,111 (D.D.C. 1979); SEC v. Sharon Steel Corp., SEC
Litig. Release No. 8,119 (D.D.C. 1977).
184 SEC v. The Fundpack, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,951
(D.D.C. 1979); SEC v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., SEC Litig. Release No. 8,121 (D.D.C.
Sept. 21, 1977); SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,509 (D.D.C. 1976). For an excellent article on this subject, see Gruenbaum
& Oppenheimer, Special Investigative Counsel: Conflicts and Roles, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 865
(1981).
185 See, e.g., SEC v. Ormand Indus., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,046 (D.D.C. 1977); SEC v. Clinton Oil, SEC Litig. Release No. 5,798 (N.D. Ohio
1973). See generally Farrand,Ancillaq Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1779 (1976).
186 See, e.g., SEC v. International Systems & Controls Corp., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,207 (D.D.C.- 1979); SEC v. Marlene Indus., Inc., SEC Litig.
Release No. 8,733 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,509 (D.D.C. 1976). Seegenerall Levine & Herlihy, How
SEC Will Continue to Use ConsentDecrees, Legal Times (Washington), June 5, 1978, at 16, col. 2;
Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC RequestedAncillay Reliefin SEC Level Inunctive Actions, 31 Bus.
LAW. 1323 (1976).
187 See, e.g., SEC v. Aydin Corp., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,111 (D.D.C. 1979); SEC v. The Fundpack, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,951 (D.D.C. 1979).
188 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1976).
189 See, e.g., In re U.S. Steel Corp., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
82,319 (1979). Pursuant to a § 15(c)(4) proceeding settled by consent, the Commission found
that the company made inadequate disclosure of environmental matters in its Exchange Act
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processes by issuing section 21 (a) reports under the Exchange Act.190
The present Commission will apparently continue, at least to a
certain extent, the policy of seeking ancillary or other equitable relief. For example, in recent actions the Commission has obtained,
through the consent process, court orders requiring that independent
directors and special agents be appointed. 19 1 Moreover, the Commission in a section 21 (a) report recently summarized the importance of
a corporation's timely disclosure of material developments where
persons, having access to nonpublic corporate information, may be
trading in the subject company's securities. 192 Thus, the Commission's enforcement program, perhaps due in part to the widely accepted propriety of ancillary relief, will continue to affect corporate
internal processes. Nonetheless, as will be discussed, the magnitude
of this impact may well be smaller than it has been in the past.
Respecting enforcement developments that affect internal corporate affairs and the Commission's perceived authority to address
this subject, an interesting evolution appears to have taken place.
The Francharddecision 193 reflected the Commission's corporate governance philosophy in 1964. In Franchard, the Commission asserted
that state law governed the obligations and responsibilities of direcreports. As part of its offer of settlement, U.S. Steel undertook to appoint a task force to
review its environmental disclosure and to prepare a report to its Audit Committee setting
forth procedures to provide for timely and complete disclosure.
190 In pertinent part, § 21(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1976), provides:
The Commission is authorized in its discretion, to publish information concerning
any such violations, and to investigate any facts, conditions, practices, or matters
which it may deem necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of such provisions,
in the prescribing of rules and regulations under this chapter, or in securing information to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation concerning the matters to which this chapter relates.
The Commission has issued a number of § 21 (a) reports that have affected corporate internal
processes. See, e.g., SEC StafReport on Proxy Solicitations in Connection with Compass Investment
Group, SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 16,343 (Nov. 15, 1979), [1979-1980] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,352; Statement by State National Bank of Magyland, SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No.
16,321 (Nov. 5, 1979), [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,341; In re
Spartek, Inc., SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 15,567 (Feb. 14, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,961.

191 See, e.g., SEC v. Petrowest, Inc., SEC Litig. Release No. 9,604 (N.D. Tex. 1982), 24
SEC Docket 1522 (March 23, 1982); SEC v. Vornado, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,377 (D.D.C. 1981); SEC v. Data Access Systems, Inc., SEC Litig.
Release No. 9,487 (D.N.J. 1981), 23 SEC Docket 1380, 1382 (Nov. 10, 1981).
192 Report of Investtgation in the Matter ofSharon Steel Corporationas it Relates to Prompt Corporate
Disclosure, SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 18,271 (Nov. 19, 1981), [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,049.
193 In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 77,113 (1964).
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tors. The Commission also indicated that it did not wish to address
this area.1 94 The Commission's philosophy changed, however, in the
1970's. The staff report in the Penn Central matter 19 5 illustrates the
beginning of this process. In that report, the staff, not the Commission, addressed what it perceived to be the directors' deficient con196
duct although it did not set any prescriptive standards.
The next significant development was the Stirling Homex reportt 9 7 in 1975. In a section 21(a) report, the Commission commented upon the inadequate performance of the outside directors,
stating that they "did not play any significant role in the direction of
[the] company's affairs even though they possessed considerable business experience and sophistication."'' 98 The Commission adhered to
this approach in SEC v. Shiell,1 99 where the Commission alleged that
the subject directors violated the antifraud provisions by neglecting
to perform their directorial duties. The Commission's complaint in
Shiell, along with the staffs affidavit in support of the motion for
preliminary injunctive relief, evidenced the continuing evolutionary
20 0
development since Franchard.
1 In 1978, the Commission continued this process in National Telephone. 201 Rather than opining on the role of directors qua directors,
the Commission identified structural deficiencies in National Telephone's corporate governance machinery. For example, the audit
20 2
committee, which consisted of three outside directors, never met.
At about the same time that National Telephone was handed down, the
194 42 S.E.C. at 178, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,113, at
82,046-48.
195

HOUSE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF RE-

PORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE

PENN CENTRAL COMPANY (Subcomm. Print 1972).

196
197
REP.
198
199
200
201
1393,
202

Id. at 7-8.
SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 11,516, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
(CCH) 80,219, at 85,462 (1975).
7 SEC Docket at 300.
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,190 (N.D. Fla. 1977).
See SEC Litig. Release No. 7,763, 11 SEC Docket 1664 (Jan. 31, 1978).
In re National Tel. Co., Inc., SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 14,380, 13 SEC Docket
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,410 (Jan. 16, 1978).
13 SEC Docket at 1395, 81,410, at 88,878. The Commission also stated:
The Commission is not saying that the directors of a company are responsible for
approving every line of every press release and periodic filing made by the company; rather the Commission is saying that, At a time of distress in a company's
existence, the directors have an affirmative duty to assure that the market place be
provided accurate and full disclosure concerning the basic viability of the company
and the continuity of its operations.
Id. at 1393.
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Commission brought an injunctive action against Killearn Properties. 20 3 There, in a consent judgment, the company was ordered to
restructure its board of directors to consist of a majority of outside
directors and to maintain an audit committee comprised solely of
20 4

outside directors.
Subsequently, the Commission in the

Wood

20

5

and Spartek20 6

proceedings embarked on the latest stage in this evolutionary process.
In these cases, the Commission restructured specific transactions,
finding that the companies' Exchange Act reports "were materially
deficient in failing to disclose the full facts and circumstances surrounding the structure of the sale of assets transaction[s], including
the purposes, and the determination of the price to be offered to
shareholders. ' 20 7 To remedy these situations, the Commission ordered the respective companies to comply with the reporting requirements and to retain a "Special Review Person" to negotiate on
20 8
behalf of the public shareholders.
The above discussion supports the conclusion that the Commission through its enforcement actions and the ancillary or other equitable relief obtained in such actions has significantly affected
corporate internal affairs. In so doing, however, the Commission has
not stretched its statutory mandates. Commission actions have been
based principally on federal disclosure violations, rather than on
breaches of fiduciary duty20 9 and hence come well within the Com2 10

mission's jurisdiction.
Although it is premature to state with certainty, future SEC enforcement policies may have an increasingly narrower scope. One
such area, as previously discussed, may concern the duty to disclose
203 SEC v. Killearn Properties, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 196,256 (N.D. Fla. 1977).
204 Id. at 92,694-95.
205 In the Matter of Woods Corp., SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 15,337, 16 SEC Docket 166 (Nov. 16, 1978).
206 In the Matter of Spartek, Inc., SEC Sec. Exch.Act Release No. 15,567, 16 SEC Docket
1094 (Feb. 14, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,961.
207 16 SEC Docket at 172.
208 16 SEC Docket at 1100, 81,961, at 81,407; 16 SEC Docket at 172. See Ferrara, The
Duty to Dirclose Qualitative MaterialInformation, in TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 145, 155-56 (1980); Ferrara, supra note 139, at 768-70. See also SEC v. WejIt Corp., SEC Litig. Release No. 3,299 (D.D.C. 1979) (in a consent judgment, the SEC alleged that Wej-It violated § 14(e) of the Exchange Act by failing to disclose to its shareholders
the full facts and circumstances regarding the manner and method by which the Wej-It board
arrived at the offering price).
209 See note 110 supra.
210 See generallj notes 78-114 supra and accompanying text.
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qualitatively material information, including unadjudicated illegalities. 2t1 Moreover, present Enforcement Director John M. Fedders
has initiated a comprehensive review of the Commission's enforcement policies and practices. 21 2 He has enumerated three specific areas for "renewed enforcement vigilance": trading while in possession
of material nonpublic information, manipulation of the securities
markets, and fraudulent disclosure practices by reporting companies. 21 3 Because these three areas directly affect the investing public
and the securities markets, they undoubtedly require vigorous SEC
enforcement. For better or worse, however, the enumerated areas of
concern, although also an essential part of the Sporkin era enforcement program, may well represent different "rhetoric and policies." 21 4 During the Sporkin era, the Commission relied on the
disclosure rationale underlying the federal securities laws as the basis
for bringing enforcement actions that affected a wide range of substantive corporate conduct. In so doing, the Commission employed
such polices as requiring disclosure of certain information because it
bears on the integrity or competency of management, irrespective of
the information's economic materiality,2 1 5 holding that professionals,
211 See notes 115-24 supra and accompanying text.
212 John M. Fedders, Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks to the 1981 SEC Accounting Conference, Foundation for Accounting Education of the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants 4-8 (Nov. 16, 1981).
Mr. Fedders announced that the initiation of this study was encouraged by Chairman Shad
and the other Commissioners. Id. at 4. The study is intended to encompass such matters as
the internal standards employed by the Commission when determining whether to litigate or
settle cases, the internal standards used for authorizing formal orders of investigation, and
whether such formal orders should automatically expire after a specified period, unless renewed by the Commission. Id. at 5. Mr. Fedders also initiated a study of the sanctions and
remedies that are available to the Commission. This study will cover three areas: whether
the present remedies and sanctions are adequate and, if not, whether the Commission should
seek legislation; whether, in appropriate circumstances, the Commission should seek injunctions that expire after a specified period or upon the fulfillment of certain conditions; and
whether the Commission should publish criteria that it would apply when deciding whether
to consent to a request for modification or dissolution of an outstanding injunction. Id. at 6-7.
The results of this study may portend a significant change in SEC enforcement policy. The
Commission's position, at this time, apparently is consistent with prior policy, namely, that
upon making a proper showing, it is entitled as a matter of statutory right to the ordering of a
permanent injunction, Brief of the SEC at 10, SEC v. Associated Minerals, Inc., Nos. 79-1449,
79-1450 (6th Cir. 1980), and that permanent injunctions should be difficult for subject parties
to modify or dissolve. SEC v. Clifton, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (COH)
98,477 (D.D.C. 1982).
213 Remarks of John M. Fedders, supra note 212, at 8-11.
214 See Hudson, supra note 42, at 18.
215 See notes 115-24supra and accompanying text. See generaloy Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg,
supra note 61.
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such as attorneys and accountants, who act as the "passkey" 21 6 to
securities offerings and other key corporate transactions, must be cog2 17
nizant of and responsible to the interests of the investing public,
and bringing enforcement actions for nondisclosure of management
perquisites and for violation of the accounting provisions of the For2
eign Corrupt Practices Act.

18

Continued vigorous advancement of the above enforcement policies appears unlikely under the present Commission. Although a
conclusive determination cannot yet be made, the present Commission's ultimate stance in pursuing these policies will significantly influence the extent to which the in lerrorem impact of potential SEC
enforcement action will continue to affect corporate internal
2

affairs.

t9

VI.

Legislative Programs

With the exception of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
(FCPA), the Commission's recent legislative program has not directly
affected internal corporate affairs. Indeed, recent Commission policy
has encouraged legislation to aid small issuers and capital formation. 220 As noted previously in regard to the Metzenbaum Bill, for216 See The EmergingResponsibilitiesof the SecuritiesLawyer, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,631 (1974)(Commissioner Sommer's speech); note 246 infra and accompanying text.
SECv.Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979);
217 See, e.g.,
SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); In re Arthur Andersen & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,900 (SEC 1974); In re Emanuel Fields, 45 S.E.C. 262
(1973), aJ'd, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d
785, 788 (9th Cir. 1979) (acceptance of the Commission's position in that case would make
the accountant "an insurer of his client's honesty and an enforcement arm of the SEC."). See
generally Gruenbaum, Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations. A Response to Professor
Kramer, 68 GEo. L.J. 191 (1979).
218 See, e.g., SEC v. Page Airways, Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,341 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824
(E.D. Wis. 1978); SEC v. Kalvax, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Playboy Enters., Inc., SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 7,059 (Aug. 13, 1980), [1980 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,635. See generally Vilkin, supra note 47, at 8. The present Commission at times has brought suit for violations of the FCPA. See, e.g., In re Telex Corp., SEC Sec.
Exch. Act Release No. 18,694 (April 29, 1982), [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,209
(April 29, 1982); SEC v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., SEC Litig. Release No. 9,437 (1981).
219 A recent article stated that "[s]ome securities lawyers say clients, sensing 'a new mood
in Washington' favorable to business, are becoming more reluctant to disclose unflattering
facts about their dealings. But other lawyers say they haven't detected any change in corporate attitudes." Hudson, supra note 42, at 1.
220 See,e.g., Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat.
2275 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 through 80a-52). In general, the Act provides special, less
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mer Chairman Williams testified in opposition to imposing federal
22I
minimum standards upon internal corporate structures.
A graphic illustration, however, of how an SEC program can
influence the effectuation of fundamental changes in corporate internal affairs is the Commission's involvement in the area of questionable foreign payments. During the mid-1970's, the Commission
investigated companies that.had channelled large sums of money to
foreign officials in order to obtain business in those countries. The
Commission not only discovered that such payments were widespread, but also learned that in many instances payments were made
without the knowledge of top corporate officers and directors, thus
reflecting a more fundamental breakdown in the process of corporate
accountability. 222 In May of 1976, the Commission reported to Congress the results of its investigations and enforcement actions, as well
as data submitted by corporations pursuant to the Commission's vol223
untary disclosure program.
Reacting to these and related developments, Congress enacted
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. The FCPA outlaws "corrupt" payments to foreign officials or political parties that are
designed to obtain or retain business for the company in question or
to direct business to any other person. In responding to the broader
accountability concerns, Congress amended section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act to require publicly-held companies to (1)
make and keep books, records and accounts that "in reasonable deburdensome treatment under the Investment Company Act of 1940 for certain venture capital companies, called "business development companies," provided they meet certain conditions. The legislation also added § 4(6) to the Securities Act, generally providing an
exemption from the Act's registration provisions for transactions involving offers or sales of
securities by an issuer solely to one or more "accredited investors," provided the offering price
does not exceed five million dollars, the amount allowed under § 3(b) of the Act. Also, the
section precludes advertising or public solicitation and requires the issuer to file a notice of
sales with the Commission.
221 See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
222 See SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 15,570 (Feb. 15, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. 81,959.
223 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL
CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976). Generally, a company partici-

pating in this program was encouraged to investigate carefully the facts under the auspices of
persons not involved in the questionable conduct and to discuss the question of appropriate
disclosure of the matters uncovered with the Commission's staff prior to filing any documents
with the Commission. d. at 6-13. As stated by the Commission in its Report, "Although
participation in the voluntary program does not insulate a company from Commission enforcement action, it does diminish the possibility that the Commission will, in its discretion,
institute an action." d. at 8 n.7.
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tail" accurately and fairly reflect the issuer's transactions and disp6sitions of assets, and (2) devise and maintain systems of internal
accounting controls sufficient to provide "reasonable assurances"
that transactions are executed in accordance with management's authorization and recorded in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, and that access to and accountability for assets
are adequately controlled. While primarily reflecting investor protection and disclosure concerns, these accounting requirements have
22 4
a direct substantive impact on day-to-day corporate management.
A fairly recent study by the General Accounting Office showed
that the FCPA's accounting provisions have forced publicly-held
companies to reevaluate and, in many cases, to improve their systems
of internal accountability.2 25 The business community has concurrently expressed serious concerns about the law, particularly the
vagueness of certain requirements, and the attendant costs of compliance.2 26 During the last Congress, the Senate passed a bill that attempted to provide greater clarity to the Act.2 2 7 The House of
224 Subsequently, the Commission adopted Regulation 13B-2, which affects recordkeeping requirements, accountability over assets, and financial statement preparation. See [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,063. Civil enforcement of the Act is currently
divided between the SEC as to public companies and the Department of Justice as to others.
For law review commentary on the FCPA, see Atkeson, The Foreign CorruptPracticesAct of 1977An InternationalApplication of SEC's CorporateGovernance Reforms, 12 INT'L LAw. 703 (1978); Baruch, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 57 HARV. Bus. REV. 32 (1979); Best, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 11 REV. SEC. REG. 975 (1978); Goelzer, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct-The Federalizationof CorporateRecordkeeping and Internal Control, 5 J. CORP.
L. 1 (1979); Herlihy & Levine, Corporate Cris: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 547 (1976); Roth, InternationalBusiness-The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977Background and Summay, 1 CORP. L. REv. 347 (1978); Siegel, The Implication Doctrine and the
Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1085 (1979); Stevenson, The SEC and Foreign
Bribeq, 32 Bus. LAw. 53 (1976); Timmeny, SEC Enforcement of the ForeignCorruptPracticesAct, 2
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 25 (1979).
225 Impact of Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct on US Business, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (March 4, 1981). The GAO did state, however, that the Commission should provide further guidance with respect to the concept of "reasonableness" contained in the FCPA's accounting provisions. In this respect, the GAO suggested that the
"SEC must elicit the views and work closely with the corporate community and the accounting profession, in determining what additional guidance is needed and the format of the
guidance." Id. at 25.
226 See, e.g., Weisberg & Reichenberg, The Price of Ambiguity." More Than Three Years Under
the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct 26-27 (Prepared for the International Division, Chamber of
Commerce of the United States 1981).
227 S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Generally, the Senate-passed bill would have, inter
alia, eliminated criminal liability premised on a violation of the Act's accounting provisions;
provided issuers, under the accounting provisions, with an affirmative "good faith" defense;
adopted a mental state for individual liability under the accounting provisions similar to a
scienter standard; adopted a definition of materiality to specify that the threshold standard
for accuracy of corporate books and records and internal controls is that which a "prudent
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Representatives, however, declined to act. 228

The Commission's position in response to these developments
has remained basically the same during both the Williams and Shad
Chairmanships. For example, during the Williams era, the Commission issued a release designed to reassure the business community
that minor or unintentional errors would not be the subject of enforcement action and that substantial deference would be accorded
to reasonable business judgments by management as to what consti22 9
tutes an appropriate accountability system for a given enterprise.
Chairman Shad expressed views consistent with the above policy
statement when he testified before Congress in regard to the proposed legislation on the FCPA. He recommended certain modifications to clarify ambiguities in the Act while preserving the FCPA's
vitality. 230 Several of the Chairman's suggestions were incorporated

in the Senate-passed bill.231 Although it is premature to state with
man would require in the management of his own affairs"; imposed liability under the antibribery provisions only if the culpable party "expressly or by course of conduct" authorized
bribery; and transfered the SEC's responsibility for civil enforcement of the antibribery provisions to the Justice Department. See [July-Dec.] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 630, at AA1 (Nov. 25, 1981). The Senate-passed bill represented a substantial modification from the bill
originally introduced by Senator Chafee. Also, the Administration's approach was rejected.
In pertinent part, this approach would have deleted the Act's accounting provisions and replaced them with a provision that would have made it a criminal offense to conceal an instance of foreign bribery. See Taylor, Move to Clari, Soften Antibnbery Law on ForeignBusiness is
Backed by Reagan, Wall St. J., May 21, 1981, at 5, col. 1.
228 See [July-Dec.] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 630, at AA-1 (Nov. 25, 1981).
229 Statement of Policy, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 17,500 (Jan. 29, 1981), [1980-1981 Transfer Binder] FED. S.c. L. REP. (CCH)
23,632 (1981).
o.
230 See Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simpl4fation Act: Joint Hearingson 708 Before
the Subcomm. on Securities and the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance and Monetafy Poliy of the Comm. on
Banking, Housing & Urban Afairs, 97th Cong., IstSess. (1981) (statement of SEC Chairman
John S.R. Shad); SEC ChairmanProposalsfor Change in Bribery Act, Legal Times (Washington),
June 22, 1981, at 14, col. 1. Also of interest is former SEC Chairman Williams' testimony
before the Committee. After discussing the FCPA's legislative history, Mr. Williams stated:
I refer to the legislative history to show that the Act was a highly visible product of
the political process. When Congress enacted the Act in 1977, it was well aware
that many members of the business community thought bribery was essential to do
business in certain parts of the world and that the Act's passage would result in loss
of business for some American companies. Nevertheless, a consensus was reached
that our government would not condone or ignore foreign bribery. And senior public officials in successive Republican and Democratic Administrations have stood
firm behind that principle.
Hearings, supra, at 487 (statement of former SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams). In his
statement, Mr. Williams also expressed his general agreement with the views presented by
Chairman Shad on behalf of the present Commission, which he believed were consistent with
the Commission's 1981 policy statement. Id. at 484.
231 See [July-Dec.] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 630, at AA-1 (Nov. 25, 1981) ("While
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any certainty the ultimate result of these developments, the FCPA
clearly remains an important illustration of how Commission efforts
to promote effective corporate disclosure can have a direct impact on
corporate internal affairs.
VII.

SEC as Amicus Curiae

The Commission not infrequently participates as amicus curiae in
litigation between private parties under the federal securities laws,
particularly in the federal appellate courts, in order to express its
views with respect to the interpretation of the applicable provisions. 232 Sometimes the issue at bar may affect corporate internal
processes. Burks v. Lasker233 presents one such example.
The issue in Burks was whether a quorum of four statutorily disinterested directors within the meaning of the Investment Company
Act could terminate a nonfrivolous shareholders' derivative action
against fellow directors on the basis that, in the exercise of their good
faith business judgment, the continuation of the litigation was not in
the company's best interests. 234 The district court, relying on the
2 35
business judgment rule, held that such termination was proper.
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that "disinterested directors of
an investment company do not have the power to foreclose the continuation of nonfrivolous litigation brought by shareholders against
'236
majority directors for breach of their fiduciary duties.
Participating as amicus curiae before the Supreme Court, the
Commission disagreed with the Second Circuit's position, reasoning
that the court's approach neglected the vital statutory role served by
disinterested directors as "watch-dogs" under the Investment Company Act. 237 In order to preserve this function, yet ensure that the

disinterested directors act in the best interests of the shareholders, the
Commission asserted that the traditional business judgment rule
should be applied within a framework of certain safeguards. Specifically, the Commission urged that a determination by disinterested
directors to terminate a nonfrivolous derivative suit should be given
several senators had pushed for a 'financial statement' materiality standard, the Senate opted
instead for a standard recommended by the SEC.").
232 See SEC Litig. Release No. 9,023 (Feb. 27, 1980), 19 SEC Docket 793 (March 11,
1980).
233 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
234 Id. at 473-74.
235 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
236 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978).
237 Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 12, Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
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effect only where the court finds that the directors were independent,
238
fully informed, and had acted reasonably.
In its decision, the Supreme Court referred to the primary role
of disinterested directors under the Investment Company Act to protect the interests of shareholders. The Court stated that "[t]here may
well be situations in which the independent directors could reasonably believe that the best interests of the shareholders call for a decision not to sue."' 23 9 Rather than directly answering the inquiry
before it, the Court promulgated a two-stage test upon which lower
courts have elaborated: 24° (1) whether the applicable state law allows the disinterested directors to terminate a shareholders' derivative suit, and (2) whether such a state rule is consistent with the
24 1
policies underlying the federal securities laws.

After Burks, the Commission during both the Williams and Shad
Chairmanships has continued to appear as amicus curiae. For example, in Maldonado v. F/nn242 and Abramowitz v. Posner,243 the Commission argued that, in view of the important function served by private
enforcement of the federal antifraud and proxy provisions, derivative
actions against a corporation's directors for violation of these provisions "may be terminated by the board of directors only if the
board's decision is an independent, fully informed, and reasonable
238 Id. at 7.
239 441 U.S. at 485.
240 See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869
(1980); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603
F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F.
Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980). See
also Zapata Corp. v. Flynn, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
393 N.E.2d 994,419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). For commentary on the subject of special litigation
committee dismissal of shareholder derivative suits against directors, see Bishop, Derivative
Suits Against Bank Directors: New Problems, New Strategies, 97 BANK L.J. 158 (1980); Block &
Barton, The BusinessJudgment Rule as Applied to Stockholder Proy Derivative Suits Under the Securities Erchange Act, 8 SEC. REC. L.J. 99 (1980); Block & Prussin, The BusinessJudgment Rule and
Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27 (1981); Coffee & Schwartz, The
Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a ProposalforLegislative Refomn, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 261 (1981); Dent, The Power of Directorsto Terminate ShareholderLitigation: The Death of the
Derivative Suit, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96 (1980); Gammon, Staving Off Derivative Suits, 12 REV.
SEC. REG. 887 (1979); Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Shareholder
Derivative Suits, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1980); Steinberg, Maldonado in Delaware: Special
Litigation Committees-An Unsafe Haven, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 381 (1982); Note, The BusinessJudgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 660 (1980).
241 441 U.S. at 480, 486.
242 495 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), remanded, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,457 (2d Cir. 1982).
243 [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,921, remanded, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,458 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Regardless of whether this standard will ulti-

mately prevail in the courts, the Commission's participation in these
cases indicates that the positions advanced through amicus curiae participation at times will continue to have a substantial impact on cor2
porate internal affairs.

VIII.

45

Advisers to Corporate Management-Lawyers and
Accountants

The Commission does not take action against lawyers or accountants because it wishes to influence the internal affairs of their
corporate clients. Nor, contrary to some unkind suggestions from
members of these learned professions, does it do so for the sheer joy of
the hunt. The Commission's concern with these professional groups
stems from the important role they, together with professionals in the
securities business itself, play in securities transactions. Indeed, it can
be most difficult for an issuer of securities to raise money from the
public without the assistance of a securities broker or dealer, an opinion from counsel, and a certificate from an auditor. These persons
24 6
possess the "passkeys" to the securities markets.
244 See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 11, Abramowitz v. Posner, [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,921 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), remanded, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,458 (2d Cir. 1982); Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae
at 9, Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), remanded, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,457 (2d Cir. 1982). As stated by the Commission:
The decision to terminate derivative suits against their fellow directors is peculiarly
one which is fraught with conflicting interests. There is a substantial risk that directors may harbor a subconscious if not conscious bias in favor of their
colleagues ...
Abramowitz Brief at 17. See Maldonado Brief at 14-15. The Second Circuit in both Maldonado
and Abramowitz disagreed with the Commission's position, holding that Delaware law is consistent with the policies underlying §§ 10(b) and 14(a). See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,458, at 92,692; [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,457, at 92,687. See also Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 12, Grossman v.
Johnson, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,619 (lst Cir. 1982) (Although the First Circuit did not resolve the issue, the Commission argued that "[t]he congressional purpose in enacting Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act, giving investment
company shareholders an express right of action to recover on behalf of the investment company excessive advisory fees received by an investment adviser, precludes termination of such
actions pursuant to the business judgment decision of the investment company's board of
directors.").
245 See, e.g., Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, General Steel Indus., Inc. v. Walco
Corp., No. 81-2345 (8th Cir.)(equitable relief such as rescission and divestiture may be
granted, pursuant to the court's discretion, to remedy violations of § 13(d) of the Exchange
Act).
246 See Shipman, The Needfor SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys
Under the FederalSecuritiesStatutes, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 231 (1973); see also notes 216-17 supra and
accompanying text.
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In light of the essential functions performed by lawyers and accountants, it is scarcely surprising that when things go wrong and the
Commission investigates the conduct of the promoters, officers, directors, and other direct participants, the actions of the broker, the lawyer, and the accountant sometimes also come into question. Just as
the process by which corporations account to their investors constituted a legitimate subject of inquiry under the Corporate Accountability Staff Study and of regulation under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, the relationship of the corporation to its legal and accounting advisers transcends particular cases and also warrants systemic study and comment.
A.

Attornes

Commission actions regarding the lawyer's relationship to the
corporate client's internal processes are most often, though not always, 247 products of SEC enforcement 248 or disciplinary proceed247 Two such prior examples were the Commission's and Staff's response to the "Georgetown Petition" and the Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Institute for Public Representation affiliated with Georgetown University Law Center in
Washington, D.C., submitted the Georgetown Petition pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976). The petition contained a request that the Commission
engage in rulemaking and adopt three proposed rules. The rules would have amended the
Commission's disclosure forms to require corporations to disclose (i) that the board of directors has instructed all attorneys employed or retained by the corporation to report to the
board certain corporate activities discovered by the attorney that, in the attorney's opinion,
violate or probably violate the law; (ii) written agreements between corporations and outside
counsel that specify, among other things, the frequency and nature of counsel's contacts with
the board of directors; and (iii) the circumstances of resignations or dismissals of general counsel or securities attorneys of the corporations. SEC Sec. Exch. Act. Release No. 16,045 (July
25, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,144, 17 SEC Docket 1376.
On July 25, 1979, the Commission put out the request for public comment, without taking
any position on the merits of the proposal. Id. The Commission received over 300 public
comments regarding this proposal. On April 30, 1980, the Commission determined to deny
the petition. SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 16,769, 19 SEC Docket 1300 (April 30, 1980).
In its release denying the petition, the Commission noted that one of the several reasons
for denial urged by commentators was that the private sector was addressing many of the
questions concerning "the nature of the obligations of attorneys to make appropriate disclosure of corporate illegalities they discover." 19 SEC Docket at 1301. Thus, the Commission
expressed the views that "it would be inappropriate, at this time, to consider further the rules
proposed by the Institute" in light of the concerns expressed by the commentators, "particularly with respect to. .. the initiative in this area being taken by the legal profession. .. "
Id. at 1302. The Commission, however, stated that it would continue to monitor developments in this area. Id. at 1303.
The Commission's reference to the "initiative in this area being taken by the legal profession" was directed at the 6ngoing work of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards of the American Bar Association ("Standards Commission"). On January 30,
1980, after more than two years of work, that group circulated for public discussion the discussion draft of the "Model Rules of Professional Conduct," which comprehensively reformu-
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ings.2 49 In these actions, the Commission has commented on the role
that attorneys play in the disclosure process and, at times, has ordered law firms' internal procedures to be restructured. For example, in In re EmanuelFields,250 the Commission asserted that securities
lawyers occupy a strategic position in the investment process and
that the SEC, with its limited resources, "is peculiarly dependent on
the probity and diligence of the professionals who practice before
' '2 5
it.
I The Commission has ordered that law firms' inadequate internal procedures be revised, and has made clear that "[a] law firm has
lated the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers. Subsequently, the
Standards Commission in May, 1981 issued its "Proposed Final Draft."
On October 30, 1980, the Commission staff filed, in the name of the General Counsel,
extensive comments on the Draft Model Rules. Included were detailed staff views of the
circumstances under which the lawyer representing a corporation may or should go over the
head of the corporate official with whom he is dealing and refer the matter to higher authority, up to and including the board of directors. The staff also proffered recommendations on
the related question of when it would be appropriate for the lawyer to give unsolicited advice
to his corporate client. The staff comments also included discussion of situations that may
arise when the board fails to act in the best interests of the shareholders of the corporation,
such as where directors have conflicts of interests. Under these circumstances, according to
the comments, counsel's responsibilities may run directly to the shareholders. Finally, although the staff stated that its comments were limited to professional responsibility questions
and were not addressed to legal liability issues, it recognized the tension which often exists
between the disclosure requirements inherent in the relationship between the corporation and
its lawyer. Comments of the General Counsel at 48-75. Contrast these views with those of the
subsequent SEC General Counsel. See Edward F. Greene, Remarks to the New York County
Lawyers' Association (Jan. 13, 1982), 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 168 (Jan. 20, 1982). See
note 266 infra.
Itwas noted in the staff document that the comments were not submitted to or reviewed
by the Commission, formally or informally, and that the Commission, as a matter of policy,
disclaimed responsibility for the private publication of its employees. The staff chose not to
submit the comments to the Commission because they focused in part upon proposed rules
concerning issues arguably present in the Carter-Johnson rule 2(e) administrative disciplinary
proceeding, which was then pending subjudice before the Commission. The staff wished to
avoid even injecting the question of a possible exparte contact or similar collateral issue in the
proceeding. Id.
248 See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979);
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). For further discussion, see Gruenbaum, supra note
217, at 204-11.
249 See, e.g., In re Carter, SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 17,597 (Feb. 28, 1981), [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847; In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp,
SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 15,982, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,124 (July 2, 1979); In re Emanuel Fields, SEC Sec. Act Release No. 5,404, [1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,407 (June 18, 1973), afd sub nom. Fields v. SEC, 495
F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
250 SEC Sec. Act Release No. 5,404, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,407 (June 18, 1973), af'dsub nom. Fields v. SEC, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
251 [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,407, at 83,174-75 n.20. The
Commission also stated that the securities lawyer "works in his office where he prepares pro-
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a duty to make sure that disclosure documents filed with the Commission include all material facts about a client of which it has
25 2
knowledge as a result of its legal representation of that client."
Undoubtedly, the most significant administrative disciplinary
proceeding recently brought pursuant to rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules
of Practice 253 is that of In the Matter of CarterandJohnson.254 In CarterJohnson, the Commission's Office of General Counsel had argued that
where management has repeatedly rejected a lawyer's advice and
persists in exposing the corporation to substantial risk of legal liability, the lawyer may have an obligation to go up the hierarchal structure within the corporation to the board of directors in order to
prevent what the lawyer believes to be present or future violations of
the law. The General Counsel argued that this duty to go to the
board may be necessary in order to fulfill the lawyer's obligation ade255
quately to advise the corporate client.
In February 1981, the Williams Commission handed down its
opinion in the Carter-Johnson case. 25 6 It reversed the decision of the
administrative law judge, who had found that Carter and Johnson,
lawyers who were experienced in corporate and securities matters,
had violated the federal securities laws and had engaged in improper
spectuses, proxy statements, opinions of counsel, and other documents that we, our staff, the
financial community, and the investing public must take on faith." Id.
252 In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 15,982, [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 182,124, at 81,929 (July 2, 1979). See In re
Plotkin, Yolles, Siegel and Turner, SEC Sec. Act Release No. 5,841, 12 SEC Docket 263 (July
5, 1977); In re Jo M. Ferguson, SEC Sec. Act Release No. 5,523, 5 SEC Docket 37 (Aug. 21,
1974).
253 Rule 2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1982), provides that the Commission may temporarily
suspend or permanently bar from practice before it any person found (1) to lack the requisite
qualifications to represent others, (2) to lack character or integrity or to have engaged in
improper or unethical professional conduct, or (3) to have willfully violated or aided and
abetted a violation of any provision of the federal securities laws or a rule or regulation thereunder. An original proceeding pursuant to rule 2(e), such as the Carter-Johnson proceeding, is
conducted as an administrative proceeding before a federal administrative law judge with a
right to administrative review by the Commission and judicial review by a United States
Court of Appeals. Some orders imposing restrictions on practice, however, are entered as a
result of an injunction or felony conviction, or by consent in settlement of outstanding
charges. These cases are disposed of summarily.
254 SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 17,597 (Feb. 28, 1981), [1981 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, reversing [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,175 (March 7, 1979).
255 Answering Brief of the Office of the General Counsel at 99-106, In re Carter & Johnson, File No. 3-5464 (Oct. 15, 1979).
256 SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,847 (March 17, 1981).
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professional conduct. 257

The Commission dismissed the proceeding against the two lawyers. While asserting once again its jurisdiction to conduct these
kinds of proceedings, 25 8 the Commission found that the lawyers were
neither direct violators nor aiders and abettors of their client's violations. 25 9 Moreover, the Commission found that the attorneys had not
violated standards of professional responsibility because it could not
conclude that the attorneys' conduct transgressed standards that
were generally accepted at the time.26 The Commission did, however, discuss the general standards of professional conduct that
should guide lawyers in the future:
[A] lawyer must, in order to discharge his professional responsibilities, make all efforts within reason to persuade his client to avoid or
terminate proposed illegal action. Such efforts could include,
where appropriate,
notification to the board of directors of a corpo261
rate client.
The Commission emphasized that the articulation of principles
of professional conduct that are applicable to the special role of the
securities lawyer giving disclosure advice to a corporate client was
not a simple task. It pointed out that the lawyer is only an adviser
and that the client must make the final decision. The Commission
257 [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 (March 7, 1979).
258 [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,146-50. See Touche
Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979), where the Second Circuit concluded:
To summarize: we reject appellant's assertion that the Commission acted
without authority in promulgating Rule 2(e). Although there is no express statutory provision authorizing the Commission to discipline professionals appearing
before it, Rule 2(e), promulgated pursuant to its statutory rulemaking authority,
represents an attempt by the Commission to protect the integrity of its own
processes. It provides the Commission with the means to ensure that those professionals, on whom the Commission relies heavily in the performance of its statutory
duties, perform their tasks diligently and with a reasonable degree of competence.
As such the Rule is "reasonably related" to the purposes of the securities laws.
Moreover, we hold that the Rule does not violate, nor is it inconsistent with, any
other provision of the securities laws. We therefore sustain the validity of the Rule
as a necessary element adjunct to the Commission's power to protect the integrity of
its administrative procedures and the public in general.
Id. at 582. See generally Downing & Miller, The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 774 (1979); Gruenbaum, The SEC's Use of Rule 2(e) to Discipline Accountants and
Other Professionals, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 820 (1981); Kramer, Clients'Fraudsand Their Lawyers'
Obligations.- A Study in ProfessionalIrresponsibility, 67 GEo. LJ. 991 (1979); Marsh, Rule 2(e)
Proceedings, 35 Bus. LAw. 987 (1980); Comment, Attorney Liability UnderSEC Rule 2(e): A New
Standard?, 11 TEX. TECH L. REv. 83 (1979).
259 [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,167-69.
260 Id. at 84,169-70.
261 Id. at 84,170.
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acknowledged that disclosure issues often present difficult choices between multiple shades of gray, and stated that the client's pressure on
its lawyer for the minimum disclosure required by law is, by itself,
not an appropriate basis for finding that a lawyer must resign or take
some extraordinary action. The opinion emphasized that the SEC
would not seek to hold lawyers responsible for the good faith exercise
of professional judgment even if, in view of hindsight, the advice
turned out to be wrong. The Commission was concerned that stiffer
requirements might drive a wedge between reporting companies and
their outside lawyers and that, under certain circumstances, management would soon realize that there was nothing to be gained from
consulting such lawyers.2 6 2 The Commission stated:
The Commission is of the view that the lawyer engages in "unethical or improper professional conduct" under the following circumstances: When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the
effectuation of a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws becomes aware that his client is
engaged in a substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure requirements, his continued participation violates professional standards unless he takes prompt steps ["that lead to the
conclusion that the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct the underlying problem, rather than having capitulated to the desire of a
strong-willed, but misguided client"] to end the client's non-compliance. .

.

. Initially, counseling accurate disclosure is sufficient,

even if [the lawyer's] advice is not accepted. But there comes a
point at which a reasonable lawyer must conclude that his advice is
not being followed, or even sought in good faith, and that his client
is involved in the continuing course of violating the securities laws.
At this critical juncture, the lawyer must take further, more affirmative steps in order to avoid the inference that he has been coopted, willingly or unwillingly, into the scheme of nondisclosure. .

.

. So long as a lawyer is acting in good faith in exerting

the law by his client, his
reasonable efforts to prevent violations of
263
professional obligations have been met.

The Commission also remarked that it intended to solicit public
comment in regard to the standard adopted.2 64 Although the Commission subsequently solicited public comment, 265 it appears questionable whether the SEC will issue a release in response to the
262 Id. at 84,169-72.
263 Id. at 84,172-73. The case did not decide whether the lawyer had a duty to make
public disclosure of the corporate client's confidences and secrets.
264 Id. at 84,170.
265 SEC Sec. Act Release No. 6,344, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 83,026 (Sept. 21, 1981).
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comments received. Such a release, if issued, could well portend the
extent to which the present Commission intends to follow or depart
from the principles of Carter-Johnson.266
B. Accountants
In the past several years, public and congressional concerns have
been voiced regarding the extent to which the accounting profession
has fulfilled its responsibility to promote public confidence in the integrity and credibility of financial reporting by publicly-owned companies.2 67 During the Williams Chairmanship, the Commission
responded both by intensifying its oversight of the accounting profession and by encouraging initiatives by the profession designed to increase public confidence (1) in the independence of accountants, (2)
in the process by which accounting and auditing standards are established, and (3) in the profession's ability and resolve to develop and
maintain a viable system of self-regulation.2 68 The Commission's increased oversight resulted in significant and accelerated changes in
the corporate structure for dealing with outside accountants and focused corporate attention on significant aspects of the company's re266 See Greene, supra note 247, where a former SEC General Counsel presented his personal views on lawyer disciplinary proceedings before the Commission, stating:
My initial tentative view is that as a general matter the Commission should ordinarily only institute Rule 2(e) proceedings if the misconduct alleged is (i) a violation
of established state law ethical or professional misconduct rules and (ii) has a direct
impact on the Commission's internal processes, such as where the lawyer participates directly or indirectly in the preparation of disclosure documents filed with the
Commission.
Id. at 168.
267 Seegeneral'y H.R. REP. No. 134, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 1976) [hereinafter referred
to as the Moss REPORT]; REPORT OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING
AND MANAGEMENT OF THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.
(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as the METCALF REPORT].
The Moss Report recommended, inter alia, that the SEC should prescribe by rule: a
framework of uniform accounting principles; penalties for falsification of books and records;
elimination of procedures that allow corporations to develop off-the-books accounts; verification in the annual report by independent auditors of the quality of internal controls and the
quality of the enforcement of those controls; a requirement that a majority of the board of
directors must be independent of management; and a requirement that the board's auditing
and nominating committees be composed of a majority of independent directors. Moss REPORT, supra, at 51-52.
The Metcalf Report recommended, inter alia, that "[t]he Federal Government should
restore public confidence in the actual independence of auditors who certify the accuracy of
corporate financial statements under the Federal securities laws by promulgating and enforcing strict standards of conduct for such auditors." METCALF REPORT, supra, at 22.
268 See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission (Second) Report to Congress on the Accounting
Profession and the Commission's OversightRo/e, [ 1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,120 (June 28, 1979).
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lationship with its accountants. 6 9
Many of the Commission's initiatives2 70 were designed to assure
the independence of outside accountants and to heighten corporate
sensitivity to situations which may compromise such independence.
One of the most successful efforts in this area related to the establishment of independent audit committees of the boards of directors of
publicly-held companies. The Commission has continued to urge
companies to establish such audit committees, both to reinforce and
assure the independence of outside auditors by providing a buffer to
insulate auditors from inordinate management pressures and to enhance the ability of the board of directors to monitor the issuer's accounting, financial reporting, and internal control systems.2 7 '
To date, the response of both individual companies and the
stock exchanges to the Commission's suggestions 27 - has obviated the
need for the Commission to require publicly-held companies to establish audit committees.2 73 While the Commission reported to Congress on July 1, 1978, that "the concept of an independent audit
committee.

.

.[had] begun to gain acceptance only recently, princi-

pally in the large companies, '2 74 the Commission's analysis of 1981
proxy statements indicated that 86.4 percent of all of the companies
maintain audit committees and, significantly, that 73.4 percent of the
relatively small (under $50 million in assets) over-the-counter companies have audit committees. 2 75 The proxy statements further indi269 Se Harold M. Williams, Chairman of the SEC, "The 1980's: The Future of the Accounting Profession," Address to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Seventh National Conference on Current SEC Developments (Jan. 3, 1980).
270 This article does not address the several initiatives taken by the profession itself.
271 See note 31 supra and accompanying text; see also notes 274-76 i~ra and accompanying
text.
272 Id.
273 Although the Commission does not require companies to maintain audit committees,
registrants must state in their proxy materials whether they maintain an audit committee,
and, if so, the composition of the committee in terms of membership, the number of meetings
held during the latest fiscal year, and a brief description of the functions of the committee.
Rule 14a-101 of the Proxy Rules (item 6(d)(1), 17 CFR § 240.14a-101 (1982)).
Regarding the Commission's authority to require publicly-held companies to maintain
independent audit committees, see the June 10, 1977, and March 2, 1978, memoranda from
Harvey L. Pitt, General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission, to Chairman
Harold M. Williams, which are reprinted in Securities and Exchange Commission (First) Report to
Congress on the Accounting Profession and the Commission's Oversight Role, [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,120 (June 28, 1979).
274 [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,120, at 81,954 (June 28, 1979).
275 See SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 18,532, Analysis ofResults of 1981 Proxy Statement
DisclosureMonitoring Program, 24 SEC Docket 1224, 1226, 1234 (March 16, 1982). See also SEC
Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 17,518, 21 SEC Docket 1551 (Feb. 5, 1981).
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cated that the new audit committees have assumed significant
oversight responsibilities, with 70.4 percent engaging and discharging
the outside auditors, 67.2 percent reviewing the audit plan, 84.5 percent reviewing the audit results, and 73.9 percent reviewing the adequacy of internal controls. 2 76 Clearly, the widespread emergence of
audit committees, accelerated by the Commission's exhortations, has
significantly altered the structure of corporate relationships with
outside auditors.
The present Commission has significantly retreated, however,
with respect to the disclosure of nonaudit services performed by auditors. The Williams Commission focused corporate attention on the
potential negative impact on auditor independence when nonaudit
services, such as management advisory services, accounting and review services, and tax services, are also performed for the audit client.
In 1978, Accounting Series Release No. 250277 required registrants to

disclose in their proxy statements the nature of nonaudit services performed by their independent auditors and the percentage relationships of the fees incurred for such services to total fees incurred for
audit services. This release was followed in 1979 by Accounting Series Release No. 264,278 in which the Commission discussed the primary factors that management, the audit committee, and the outside
auditor should consider in determining whether the auditor's independence will be compromised by providing management advisory
services ("MAS") to an audit client. These factors included the relationship between revenues generated from MAS and from audit services, whether the MAS engagement improperly encompassed
managerial and decisionmaking functions that were the client's responsibility, whether the services provided could ultimately result in
auditor self-review, and whether audit quality might benefit from the
performance of MAS which increased the auditor's understanding of
the client's business. Viewing these Commission pronouncements as
significant barriers to providing MAS, the accounting profession's response was highly negative.2 79 Nonetheless, former Chairman Williams in a January 1980 address to the accounting profession stated
that he was "somewhat disappointed at the tone and focus of the
276 24 SEC Docket at 1235.
277 [Accounting Series Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 72,272 (June 29,
1978).
278 [Accounting Series Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,286 (June 14,
1979).
279 See SEC Scuttles Rule RequiringDidc/osure ofNonaudit Tasks Handled by Auditors, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 29, 1982, at 8, col. 1.
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profession's response" and stressed that "there is significant public
' 280
interest and concern surrounding this issue.
Only two years after the adoption of ASR 264 and less than five
years after the Metcalf Report recommended that "[d]irect and indirect representation of clients' interests and performance of non-accounting management advisory services for public or private clients
are two activities which are particularly incompatible with the responsibilities of independent auditors, and should be prohibited by
Federal standards of conduct, ' 28 1 the Commission rescinded ASR's
250 and 264.282 In so doing, the Commission stated:
Notwithstanding this action, the Commission believes it should
continue to monitor the nonaudit service activity by accountants as
a part of its oversight of the accounting profession. Other people
may also want to monitor this activity. The Commission is satisfied
with the information that will be available because of recent revision of the membership requirements of the SEC Practice Section
of the Division for
Firms of the American Institute of Certified Pub283
lic Accountants.
Thus, the Commission relied in part upon the promulgation of selfregulatory standards which, although not as extensive as the SEC
pronouncements, 2 84 require member accounting firms in lieu of registrants to disclose information about nonaudit management advisory

services.
IX.

Conclusion

The Commission's role in influencing how corporations should
be governed and how management should account to shareholders
has been multi-varied, controversial, and, at times, quite effective.
Two variables, both of which are significantly changing, affect the
ongoing process of influencing corporate internal affairs; one is the
membership of the Commission and certain of its senior staff, and the
other is the larger context of American political and corporate life.
280 Williams, supra note 269, at 14.
281 METCALF REPORT, supra note 267, at 22.
282 Accounting Series Release No. 304, 24 SEC Docket 938, 6 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
72,326 (Jan. 28, 1982). The Commission rescinded the rule also because it believed that the
disclosure requirement was "not generally of sufficient utility to investors to justify continuation of [this] requirement." Id. at 62,985.
283 Id. at 62,986.
284 See Wall St. J., supra note 279 (stating that the AICPA's rule does not require as extensive disclosure as the SEC's pronouncements did, because, "[a]mong other things, the institute's rule requires auditors rather than companies, to disclose their nonaudit services, and
doesn't require them to name the companies for which they provide the services.").
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Although it is difficult to predict with certainty the future of the
ongoing process, it is probable that, with the possible exception of the
American Law Institute's Tentative Draft Restatement on Corporate
Governance,28 5 the Staff's Corporate Accountability Report represents the highwater mark. Nonetheless, irrespective of the present
Commission's interest in promoting corporate accountability, the
very nature of the SEC's processes signifies that SEC programs and
policies will continue to significantly affect corporate internal affairs.

285 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982). Se also American Law Institute Begins Debate on

Corporate Governance Project, 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1025 (June 4, 1982) (discussing
provisions of and debate regarding the reporters' tentative draft).

